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Abstract: Ever since shareholder rights plans or “poison pills” were devised,
there has been staunch disagreement about whether the measures overinsulate
management and harm returns or whether such defenses are necessary to ensure
shareholders get the best possible deal in a change of control transaction. Responding to a inter-provincial regulatory dispute, Canada has recently amended
its takeover regulations to create an extended deposit period accompanied by a
majority-tender requirement which has enhanced target-board negotiating power. This Note argues that such a change would benefit both the takeover regimes
of both the United States and United Kingdom by making the former more takeover friendly and the latter less so.
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I. INTRODUCTION
“Popular opinions . . . are often true, but seldom or never the whole
truth. . . . [E]very opinion which embodies somewhat of the portion
of truth which the common opinion omits, ought to be considered
precious, with whatever amount of error and confusion that truth
may be blended.”
J.S. Mill, On Liberty, 85–86

Since 1983, a cold war has been fought over whether corporate boards
may defend themselves against hostile takeovers. Law and economics
scholars and institutional shareholders vehemently oppose defensive mechanisms, while other scholars, corporate attorneys, and management claim
they must be able to delay or defeat a takeover to fulfill their fiduciary duties. Regulators in the United Kingdom allow boards hardly any defensive
tactics while the courts in the United States allow management practically
impenetrable takeover defenses. Canadian regulators, facing regulatory divergence in different provinces over the extent to which boards could adopt
defensive measures, have renewed their role as defenders of moderation.
They have promulgated rules with the potential not only to harmonize the
contradictory policies among provincial regulators, but also to provide the
United States and the United Kingdom—not to mention academics and
practitioners—a means to achieve détente in the fight over who has control
in a hostile takeover. In short, the Canadian Rule offers an elegant solution
that maintains board negotiating ability while empowering shareholders.
The most important and controversial defensive measure a board may
employ when facing a hostile takeover is a “poison pill” or “shareholder
rights plan.” It is a defensive measure that an American or Canadian corporate board may adopt in order to resist an acquiring entity’s efforts to gain
control of the company in a tender offer.1 The typical pill works by providing all shareholders other than acquirer with the right to obtain more shares
at a below-market price.2 Shareholders eagerly exercise these rights, diminishing the economic value of an acquirer’s shares and diluting the percentage stake the acquirer owns in the target firm.3 The poison pill prevents
takeover by making it economically infeasible for an acquirer to buy
enough shares to gain a controlling stake in the target corporation.4
Part II of the Note introduces the academic debate between those who
believe boards need shareholder rights plans to fend off hostile takeovers
while maximizing shareholder value and those who believe that shareholders always know best when deciding to tender in a takeover bid. Part III
1
2
3
4

19 AM. JUR. 2D CORPORATIONS § 2186 (2015).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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explains the general workings of the Canadian takeover regime and how
regulatory interventionism brought about the proposed amendments. After
considering how the new rules benefit the Canadian system, Part IV sketches the American takeover regime and highlights the doctrinal and statutory
developments that have caused an overabundance of board discretion that
leaves managers entrenched and shareholders with few options. The Canadian rules are analyzed in the American context, and while not fully satisfying either the pro-board or pro-shareholder camps, the new rules seem to
offer an elegant solution that maintains board negotiating ability while empowering shareholders. Part V considers the British takeover regime and
offers the Canadian rules as a solution to the United Kingdom’s persistent
problem that target boards are always in a weaker negotiating position relative to the acquirer.
I. JUST WHAT ARE WE FIGHTING OVER? SHAREHOLDERS
VERSUS BOARDS
First, a key distinction in Anglo-American corporate law: in the United
States, United Kingdom, and Canada, a tender offer is when an acquiring
company offers to buy shares from current shareholders with the goal of
amassing enough shares to gain control of a company by electing new corporate directors.
This is different from the American statutory “merger” where an acquiring company offers buy shares of the target after which the target will
cease to exist as a separate corporate form. In most American jurisdictions,
a majority of shareholders of the target corporation will need to vote on the
transaction.5 In Canada, similar statutory transactions are called “amalgamations” or “plans of arrangement,” and they usually require approval by
two-thirds of target shareholders.6 In the United Kingdom, a similar procedure called a “scheme of arrangement” requires 75% target shareholder approval.7 While UK schemes of arrangement will be mentioned briefly at the
end of this paper, the primary focus is on tender offers, and in particular
5

In a merger, the transaction is governed by Delaware General Corporate Law (“DGCL”), DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (West 2014). When considered together, subsections 251(c) and (f) provide that
a majority of outstanding shares of a target corporation must vote to approve a merger transaction (the
most common form of takeover). This is the most common rule. Compare MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT
§ 12.02(e) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011) (majority vote), and CAL. CORP. CODE § 1001 (West 2014) (majority
vote), with 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11.20(a) (2014) (two-thirds majority unless certificate of incorporation specifies otherwise).
6
See, e.g., Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c-44, s 183(5) (Can.); Ontario Business
Corporations Act, R.S.O. 1990, c B.16, s 176(4) (Can.). This paper will not discuss Canadian plans of
arrangement because, unlike in the United Kingdom, arrangements in Canada likely cannot be used to
accomplish takeovers. See JENNIFER PAYNE, SCHEMES OF ARRANGEMENT: THEORY, STRUCTURE AND
OPERATION 140 (2014).
7
PAYNE, supra note 6, at 21.

550

36_3_3 CARPENTER FINAL.docx (DO NOT DELETE)

10/10/16 8:32 PM

Medication in Moderation
36:547 (2016)

hostile tender offers where the acquirer does not have the support of the target’s board of directors. Since a poison pill is the best way for a target
board to thwart a tender offer and subsequent change of directors, it is the
gold standard of takeover defenses.
The poison pill was conceived following the takeover craze of the
1970s, and academics have argued over the device’s utility (or lack thereof)
ever since.8 What I will call the “board-centric” side seeks to insulate
boards from “activist” shareholders “interfering” with management’s running of the company or its attempts to maximize shareholder value in any
change of control transaction. Supporters of the board-centric view argue
that poison pills and other takeover defenses properly protect the ability of
the board of directors to maximize shareholder value while reducing agency
costs.9 “Shareholder-centric” academics and financial institutions view
board defensive measures like poison pills as merely tools used to entrench
and enrich underperforming management.10
A. Corporate Boards or Bust
Board-centric academics and corporate lawyers criticize their shareholder-centric counterparts for overemphasizing the maximization of shareholder value arguing that it has negative consequences for firms and the
wider economy.11 They argue that insulating corporate boards is necessary
to increase director sensitivity to pressure by shareholders and market forces.12 Unfortunately, such outsized shareholder influence leads to excessive
8

Frank Allen & Steve Swartz, Lenox Rebuffs Brown-Forman, Adopts Defense, WALL ST. J., June
16, 1983, at 2 (relating the details surrounding the primogenitor shareholder rights plan, the first “poison
pill”). See also John Armour, Jack B. Jacobs, & Curtis J. Milhaupt, The Evolution Of Hostile Takeover
Regimes In Developed And Emerging Markets, 52 HARV. INT’L L.J. 219, 241 (2011) (explaining the
macroeconomic and regulatory causes of the 1970s takeover wave and the reasons why the poison pill
emerged as America’s takeover defense of choice).
9
See Martin Lipton & Paul K. Rowe, The Inconvenient Truth About Corporate Governance: Some
Thoughts on Vice-Chancellor Strine’s Essay, 33 J. CORP. L. 63, 65–66 (2007). Lipton and Rowe argue
vociferously that shareholders have inadequate information and insufficient time to make adequately
informed long-term investment decisions; they declaim as exaggerated the alleged “agency problem” in
which the interests of corporate directors and shareholders impermissibly diverge, and advocate renewed
adherence to board-centric corporate governance. To explain why Delaware courts go along with this
view, see Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware’s Takeover Law: The Uncertain Search for
Hidden Value, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 521 (2002) (detailing a “hidden value” model of takeovers to explain
Delaware judicial decision making regarding mergers and acquisitions).
10
E.g., Matthew E. Souther, The Effects of Takeover Defenses: Evidence From Closed-End Funds,
119 J. FIN. ECON. 420, 420 (2016) (finding that in closed-end funds the use of takeover defenses negatively impact firm value while financially benefitting managers).
11
See Lynne L. Dallas, Short-Termism, the Financial Crisis, and Corporate Governance 267 (University
of
San
Diego
Legal
Studies
Research
Paper
No.
12-078,
2012),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2006556.
12
See LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, THE SPECULATION ECONOMY: HOW FINANCE TRIUMPHED OVER
INDUSTRY 1–7 (2007), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1017923.
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corporate risk-taking.13 Some scholars argue that this partially caused the
Great Recession in the United Kingdom.14 Regardless, many attribute the
ills of shareholder activism to the increasing activities of “[m]oney manager
intermediaries constitut[ing] a supermajority of those wielding actual
stockholder rights rather than the long-term investors whose money is actually invested.”15 In other words, board-centric academics argue that those
voting the shares might have different interests from those who actually
own them.
In the context of a hostile takeover, many corporate boards are leery
because they know that activist shareholders (like mutual funds, pension
funds, and hedge funds) are looking to improve short-term results.16 Unfortunately, the short-term strategy usually means the target company’s returns
will suffer as value is “extracted” at the expense of long-term fiscal stability.17 While it is true that corporate directors often make quarterly share
price increases their top priority, directors’ self-interest in keeping the company solvent so they can keep their jobs moderates their temptation to pursue short-term gains at all costs. Still, corporate directors may worry that
without unilateral discretion to adopt a poison pill, institutional investors
might vote to tender their shares on a whim for a quick profit even though
the acquirer has no interest in improving the health of the target. But this is
not the only kind of harm that target boards face from potential activist acquirers.
It is also possible that activist acquirers are not interested in maximizing shareholder value in the traditional sense. Law Professors Henry Hu of
the University of Texas and Bernard Black of Northwestern University
point out that money manager investors frequently hedge their investments
in corporations with derivatives and debt-equity swaps, which allows them
to separate their control rights from the incentives of owning equities.18
13

See William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment,
158 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 656 (2010) (arguing that investors’ value-maximizing incentives and incomplete
perception of risk relative to managers makes them even less able to judge the appropriateness of risktaking when compared with the board).
14
David Kershaw, The Illusion of Importance: Reconsidering the UK’s Takeover Defence Prohibition, 56 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 267, 269 (2007) (citing Martin Lipton, Corporate Governance in the Age of
Finance Corporatism, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1987)).
15
Leo E. Strine, Jr., Can We Do better by Ordinary Investors? A Pragmatic Reaction to the Dueling Ideological Mythologists of Corporate Law, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 455–56 (2014).
16
See Carl Ackermann, Richard McEnally & David Ravenscraft, The Performance of Hedge
Funds: Risk, Return, and Incentives, 54 J. FIN. 833, 834 (1999).
17
See Alon Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism: A Review, 4 FOUND. & TRENDS IN FIN. 185, 222
(2010) (finding target operating profitability declines upon acquisition and does not recover until two
years later, if at all).
18
Henry T. C. Hu & Bernard Black, Equity and Debt Decoupling and Empty Voting II: Importance
and Extensions, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 625, 626 (2008) (describing the ways in which control and equity
interests can be decoupled such that large shareholders benefit by exercising their control to the detriment of the company and other shareholders, including during takeovers).
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Once economic and control rights are separated, institutional investors will
focus more on short-term rather than long-term value.19 Such investors may
seek to take over companies for a short period of time simply to engage in
arbitrage.20 These kinds of acquirers have motives totally divorced from
improving shareholder value over the long term.21 Still, law and economics
scholars favoring total shareholder control in hostile takeovers might reply
that even if Hu and Black are correct that arbitrage and misaligned institutional investor incentives pose a problem, it is not serious enough to warrant
giving boards the power to completely insulate themselves from hostile
takeover using shareholder rights plans.22
In response to these arguments that the rise of institutional investors
should justify the ability of directors to maintain a poison pill without a
shareholder vote, law and economics scholars engage in a flanking maneuver and attack a different justification for allowing boards to use poison
pills, namely “substantive coercion.” The doctrine of substantive coercion
posited that boards should have the ability to address the risk posed by fully-informed-but-rather-nervous shareholders mistakenly accepting a hostile
bid that undervalued the company.23 Professors Ronald Gilson and Jeffrey
Gordon argue that if these well-informed institutional investors and arbitrageurs really are as prevalent as board-centric scholars warn, then “substantive coercion” should no longer pose a problem.24 Where institutional investors already hold a large stake in the target, they may have a superior
understanding of both the target’s business prospects and the relative value
of an offer from a hostile acquirer. In such a situation, Gilson and Gordon
would argue that there is no danger of “substantive coercion” because the
well-informed and experienced institutional investors are in no danger of
“mistakenly” selling their shares. Hence, Delaware case law giving corporate boards a free hand to adopt poison pills would be called into question
because those cases rely in part on the danger of substantive coercion as
19

Id.
See Bernard Black, Bernard S., Equity Decoupling and Empty Voting: The Telus Zero-Premium
Share Swap (Northwestern Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 12-16, 2012), reprinted in M&A Lawyer,
October 2012, at 1, 4–8, http://ssrn.com/abstract=2150345.
21
See Jordan M. Barry, et al., On Derivatives Markets and Social Welfare: A Theory of Empty Voting and Hidden Ownership 7 (Stanford Law and Econ. Olin Working Paper No. 433, Aug. 22, 2012),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2134458.
22
Mark J. Roe, Corporate Short-Termism—In the Boardroom and in the Courtroom, 68 BUS. LAW.
978, 1005–06 (2013).
23
Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Agency Capitalism: Further Implications of Equity Intermediation 22–23 (European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) Law Working Paper No. 239/2014;
Stanford Law and Econ. Olin Working Paper No. 456; Columbia Law and Econ. Working Paper No. 46,
Feb. 1, 2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2359690.
24
Id. See generally Usha Rodrigues, Corporate Governance in and Age of Separation of Ownership from Ownership, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1822 (2010) (providing an in-depth comparison of the conflicts
that can arise between long-term shareholders like index and pension funds to more activist short-term
shareholders like hedge funds).
20
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justification for using a shareholder rights plan.25
Still, Gilson and Gordon do not consider the enormous agency problems identified by Hu and Black that arise when a “shareholder” holds only
control rights and is betting against the target company in a takeover because the shareholder is in league with the hostile acquirer. Without a poison pill, such phantom shareholders can and will vote in favor of a takeover
to the detriment of all other shareholders without suffering negative economic consequences. Indeed, Hu and Black show that decoupling control
and equity stakes misaligns incentives so that shareholders might look to
sell even when the share price is below what any normal shareholder would
accept (i.e., at a price below what would be acceptable to a person holding
both the legal and economic interests in the shares).26 As Chief Justice
Strine puts it, “institutional investors have emerged who seem to be motivated by a desire for engagement for reasons unrelated to investment value.”27 Plus, even when activist acquirers like hedge funds are interested in
maximizing investment value, their activism imposes significant costs.
Shareholder votes are time consuming, inefficient, and expensive—the only
ones with the time to be activists are the intermediary money managers and
hedge fund managers.28
American jurists are not the only ones questioning the unbridled model
of shareholder primacy. The idea that it may be detrimental to focus solely
on maximizing shareholder has gained some traction in Canada and the
United Kingdom.29 In fact, Hu and Black have a Canadian counterpart who
wanted to use the new regulations to restrict “empty voting” and decou25

Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum, 439 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) (holding that courts may leave in
place defensive measures like poison pills under the business judgment rule to the extent that such
measures are “reasonable in relation to the threat posed”).
26
See Hu & Black, supra note 17, at 631–636 (describing the ways in which control and equity interests can be decoupled such that large shareholders benefit by exercising their control to the detriment
of the company and other shareholders, including during takeovers).
27
See Strine, supra note 15, at 455–56.
28
See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L.
REV. 1735, 1740 (2006) (conceding that shareholder votes on takeovers are inherently necessary but not
indicative of some wider need to expand shareholder voting to other subjects properly and efficiently
within the sole discretion of the board).
29
See Carol Liao, Corporate Governance Reform for the 21st Century: A Critical Reassessment of
the Shareholder Primacy Model, 43 OTTAWA L. REV. 187 (2013) (arguing the law and economics
“shareholder primacy model encourages corporate behavior that perpetuates the likelihood of future crises” and suggesting reforms to the core features of corporate structures as a solution); Michael Marin,
Disembedding Corporate Governance: The Crisis of Shareholder Primacy in the UK and Canada, 39
QUEEN’S L.J. 223 (2013) (arguing for corporate reform on the socialist philosophy and legal theory).
One last point is that shareholder-centric systems, or “outsider systems,” like that of the United Kingdom, tend to make companies slightly less stable “because managers are not free to build up cash reserves that could help protect jobs during temporary economic downturns, because they are under constant pressure to deliver short-term shareholder value.” Helen Callaghan, Economic Nationalism,
Network-Based Coordination, and The Market for Corporate Control: Motives for Political Resistance
to Foreign Takeovers 5 (MPIfG Discussion Paper, No. 12/10, 2012), http://hdl.handle.net/10419/67720.
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pling.30 Canadian and American academics criticize American law and economics scholarship for downplaying the “significant proportion of firms”
that “experience losses as a result of hedge fund activism” and for “overlook[ing] . . . the possibility that whatever wealth is created by hedge fund
activism may reflect only a wealth transfer from bondholders, employees,
or other claimants.”31 One pair of scholars went so far as to refute (if not deride) Professor Bebchuk’s most recent 2014 paper as a misadventure in
dummy variables and spurious causal inferences.32 Moreover, some Canadian scholars in the “stakeholder” school of thought fiercely contest the idea
that directors are entrenched at all, pointing to the fact that most takeover
agreements improve share prices so substantially that directors cannot wait
to cash in their stock options.33 This can change “hostility into a welcome
mat,” even if it is not in best the long-term interests of investors, the company, or employees.34
Finally, and most importantly, there is substantial evidence that being
able to resist a hostile takeover is beneficial for shareholders. Implementing
a shareholder rights plan forces the acquirer to pay the added value that accompanies gaining control of the target, the “control premium.”35 This premium is 5–10% higher when a company has adopted a poison pill.36 In other words, the bidding contest for control of the target company frequently
“culminates in an acquisition on terms superior to the initial hostile offer.”37
30

Robert E.P. Shaw, What We Don’t Know Can Hurt Us—Ontario’s Regulation of Empty Voting
and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 29 BANKING & FIN. L. REV. 517, 519–21 (2014).
31
John C. Coffee & Palia Darius, The Impact of Hedge Fund Activism: Evidence and Implications
3–4 (European Corporate Governance Institute Law Working Paper No. 266/2014; Columbia Law and
Econ. Working Paper No. 489, 2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2496518. For a similarly skeptical continental European perspective, see generally Luca Eniques & Matteo Gatti, Creeping Acquisitions in Europe: Enabling Companies to Be Better Safe than Sorry (European Corporate Governance Institute Law
Working Paper No. 264/2014; Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 69/2014, 2014),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2492158. When researchers focused on the performance of U.K. companies
they found “there is no clear evidence of improved post-acquisition performance.” Christian Tuch &
Noel O’Sullivan, The Impact of Acquisitions on Firm Performance: A Review of the Evidence, 9 INT’L J.
MGMT. REVIEWS 141, 149 (2007).
32
See Yvan Allaire & Francois Dauphin, “Activist” Hedge Funds: Creators of Lasting Wealth?
What Do the Empirical Studies Really Say? 6 (July 16, 2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2460920. Even
economists concede that event studies have statistical “shortcomings.” Marina Martynova & Luc
Renneboog, A Century of Corporate Takeovers: What Have We Learned and Where Do We Stand?, 32
J. BANKING & FIN. 2148, 2512 (2008).
33
Letter from Yvan Allaire, Exec. Chair of the Institute for Governance to the Ontario Securities
Commission and Autoritê des marchés financiers regarding CSA Request for Comment on Proposed
National Instrument 62-203 (June 26, 2013), http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/SecuritiesCategory6-Comments/com_20130627_62-203_insituegovprivate_en.pdf.
34
Id.
35
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
36
See John Laide, Poison Pill M&A Premiums, SHARKREPELLANT (Aug. 30, 2005),
https://www.sharkrepellent.net/pub/rs_20050830.html.
37
Carmody v. Toll Bros., 723 A.2d 1180, 1186 (Del. Ch. 1998).
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The economic benefits of rights plans for shareholders are well-recognized
by American courts, which makes them “extremely reluctant to order the
redemption of poison pills on fiduciary grounds.”38
Overall, the board-centric camp has compelling arguments from experience, and their perspective is shared by most Delaware judges, if not most
judges generally. They raise issues regarding empty voting and posttakeover firm performance that those favoring shareholders have yet to satisfactorily answer.
B. Shareholders Claim Primacy
Shareholder-centric academics and institutional investors counter by
arguing that anti-takeover measures like poison pills and classified or
“staggered” boards merely entrench incumbent management while denying
shareholders the opportunity to benefit from a potential takeover.39 Law and
economics scholars concede that protecting boards from removal may help
them attain higher acquisition premiums for shareholders,40 but they argue
that “incumbents might use whatever additional power comes with such
protection to extract side payments for themselves rather than higher premia
for shareholders.”41 Additionally, Professor Lucian Bebchuk argues that
policies insulating managers from shareholders will give them less incentive to serve shareholder interests, particularly when managers know they
can thwart any hostile takeover attempt with a poison pill, “or at least . . .
extract a good deal for themselves.”42 Without the “disciplinary threat” of a
takeover, Bebchuk argues, management agency costs will increase and corporate performance will decrease.43
In response to Justice Strine’s criticisms, the shareholder-centric academics—including Professor Bebchuk—have produced studies purportedly
38

Id.
See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, A New Approach to Takeover Law and Regulatory
Competition, 87 VA. L. REV. 111, 113–14 (2001); see also Lucian A. Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, The
Costs of Entrenched Boards, 78 J. FIN. ECON. 409 (2005) (finding poison pills in combination with staggered boards over-insulate directors causing a decrease in firm value); but see Michael D. Frakes, Classified Boards and Firm Value, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 113 (2007) (agreeing classified boards reduce firm
value on average while questioning the Bebchuk’s underlying empirical methods and finding negative
effects only among the quintile of largest firms and positive effects on firm value in the quintiles containing smaller firms).
40
See Robert Comment & G. William Schwert, Poison or Placebo? Evidence on The Deterrence
and Wealth Effects of Modern Antitakeover Measures, 39 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 38 (1995) (finding “takeover
premiums are higher when target firms are protected by state laws or [poison] pills suggest[ing] that the
relative bargaining positions . . . are altered by these antitakeover devices, raising . . . gains to the target”).
41
See Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 37, at 415–17.
42
Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case Against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers, 69 U. CHI. L. REV.
973, 993 (2002).
43
Id. at 994.
39
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showing shareholder activism does not hurt long-term returns.44 In addition,
these scholars claim there is no evidence that institutional investors engage
in “pump-and-dump” patterns of activism.45 Still, it is unclear whether Bebchuk’s study reflects situations in which equity and control stakes have
been bifurcated. In particular, Bebchuk and his coauthors use historical
stock price, balance sheet, cashflow, and news headlines, but it does not
seem as though they have accounted for the kind of cash-settled equity
swaps and derivatives that can be used to get economic ownership without
the formal exchange or sale of securities.46 Hence, the law and economics
scholarship may underrepresent the dangers posed by predatory acquirers
and short-term focused arbitrageurs, which would lead scholars like Bebchuk to underestimate the importance of giving target boards the ability to
resist a hostile takeover.
Other researchers sympathetic to shareholder interests vis-à-vis boards
take a completely different tack, positing that the “short-termism” argument
overlooks the economic fundamentals of the U.S. market. In particular, Professor Mark J. Roe of Harvard Law School argues that any distortions
caused by short-termism holdings are offset by venture capital and private
equity markets, and that high-frequency trading data has created an illusion
that holding periods have shortened when in reality major shareholding institutions like mutual and pension funds still hold their shares for the longterm.47 Still, Roe does not argue that short-termism is not a problem, only
that the current level of protection afforded by American law is more than
sufficient and that threats of short-termism should not be used to further expand board discretion.48 Roe necessarily concedes that shareholder rights
plans must play a role in defending against investors motivated by goals
other than maximizing investment value.
To be sure, the body of law and economics scholarship that underlies
the shareholder primacy model and its supporters is substantially larger than
that of the pro-board scholars and practitioners. Still, using linear equations
to explain complex phenomena without accounting for important differences (e.g., industry type) or data discrepancies (e.g., not correcting for
companies that were liquidated post-takeover) does raise legitimate ques-

44

Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav & Wei Jiang, The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism,
115 COLUM. L. REV. 1085, 1085 (2015). See generally Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth That Insulating
Boards Serves Long-Term Value, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1637 (2013).
45
This refers to situations where shareholders push for increased profits or shareholder distributions
and sell their stake before the inevitable period of abnormal negative long-term returns sets in, not to the
fraudulent practice of making false and misleading statements to the marketplace to artificially inflate a
microcap stock. See “Pump-and-dumps” and Market Manipulations, S.E.C. FAQ (last visited Feb. 14,
2015), http://www.sec.gov/answers/pumpdump.htm.
46
See Hu & Black, supra note 18, at 635.
47
See Roe, supra note 22, at 1000.
48
Id. at 1005–06.
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tions.49 Nevertheless, the quantity of academic research supporting shareholder primacy tempers most assertions that correlation and causation may
have been confused.
C. Charting a Third Way
Despite each side’s assertion of a monopoly on truth, it may be the
case that both the shareholder-centric and board-centric camps have valid
claims, despite their dire predictions about their opponents’ policies. Indeed, Delaware Chief Justice Leo Strine, has argued that pro-board of directors “insulation advocates” and supporters of “shareholder driven direct
democracy” are both too extreme in their policy prescriptions.50 Justice
Strine suggests compromise modifications to American corporate law wholly satisfying to neither side of the board-shareholder academic divide; these
changes are reminiscent of the recently amended Canadian system.51 Hence,
it would seem appropriate to consider what lessons may be learned from the
recently amended Canadian securities regime.
III. THE CANADIAN SYSTEM OF HOSTILE TAKEOVERS
The Canadian policy on poison pills (“shareholder rights plans” or
“SRPs”) and takeover bids has an advantage over both the British and
American policy regimes because Canada protects shareholder choice while
preserving management bargaining ability. With minor modification, the
Canadian policy can be readily adapted to both the American and British
contexts to the benefit of both systems.52

49

See Strine, supra note 15, at 461–64 .
Id. at 449.
51
Id. at 498–99. For instance, now-Chief Justice Strine suggests that corporate boards should be
unclassified so that there is always less than a year before the bidder can launch a proxy fight to gain
control of the board (which is possible even with less than fifty percent of shares because of plurality
voting). Id. This has similar effect to the Canadian 120-day maximum length for poison pills, granted it
is only one-third the length. Both provisions give target boards a finite period of time to negotiate with a
determined hostile acquirer before facing a shareholder. In Canada, shareholders vote on whether to approve maintaining the poison pill, and under Strine’s rule the same thing effectively happens when the
existing shareholders decide whether to side with the acquirer in a proxy fight (who, if victorious, will
take control of the board and rescind the pill).
52
Canadian Securities Administrators, ONT. SEC. COMM’N, CSA Notice 62-306: Update on Proposed National Instrument 62-105 Security Holder Rights Plans and AMF Consultation Paper An Alternative Approach to Securities Regulators’ Intervention in Defensive Tactics (Sept. 11, 2013),
http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/Securities-Category6/rule_20140911_62-306_update-holderrights-plan.pdf. The Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA) is a voluntary cooperative body that devises consensus based policy recommendations with the goal of enactment by the independent territorial
securities commissions. Overview, CANADIAN SECURITIES ADMINISTRATORS, http://www.securitiesadministrators.ca/aboutcsa.aspx?id=45 (last visited Nov. 9, 2014).
50
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A. The Canadian Legal Apparatus: Statutes, Regulators, and
Regulations
The Canadian constitution constrains the federal government such that
the Canadian securities regime is governed largely by provincial statutes
and enforced by provincial officials.53 Unlike the American regime, which
relies on state courts and corporate law to determine the validity of takeover
defenses and SEC regulations to moderate certain aspects of the takeover
process, each Canadian province has its own statute setting up an independent securities commission capable of promulgating rules and adjudicating
disputes.54 In sharp contrast to Delaware’s hegemony over American corporate law, no single Canadian territory or province has a monopoly on incorporating businesses, so variations and contradictions among provincial regulators and regulations are more likely to cause friction.55
One key feature of the Canadian system is that securities regulators
have the power to enact a wide variety of orders if they deem it to be in the
public interest.56 For instance, the prototypical Securities Act (Ontario),
R.S.O. 1990, c S.5, sec 127(1), gives the Ontario Securities Commission the
power to exercise this “public interest jurisdiction” to command, inter alia,
that “trading in any securities by or of a person or company or that trading
in any derivatives by a person or company cease permanently or for such
period as is specified in the order.”57 This particular order is called a “cease
53

It is unclear whether a national scheme of securities regulation would be constitutional in Canada. In an advisory opinion, the Canadian Supreme Court held that the Government’s proposed securities
act “as presently drafted is not valid under the general branch of the federal power to regulate trade and
commerce under s 91(2) of the Constitution Act, 1867.” Reference Re Securities Act, [2011] 3 S.C.R.
837, ¶ 134 (Can.). The Court opined that “Parliament cannot regulate the whole of the securities system
simply because aspects of it have a national dimension,” but the Court left open the possibility for a cooperative federalism type solution while refusing to speculate as to the permissible contours of such a
scheme. Id. ¶¶ 7–10. By most accounts, it seems Canadian securities regulation will remain at the state
or territorial level for the foreseeable future.
54
In the provinces, Commissions are established unless otherwise noted: Securities Act (Alberta),
R.S.A. 2000, c S-4, § 11 (Can.); Securities Act (British Columbia), R.S.B.C. 1996, c 418, § 4, (Can.);
Securities Act (Manitoba), C.C.S.M. 2012, c S50, sec 2(1) (Can.); Securities Act (New Brunswick),
S.N.B. 2004, c S-5.5, § 4 (Can.); Securities Act, R.S.N.L. 1990, c S-13, § 3 (Can.) (establishing Superintendent of Securities); Securities Act (Ontario), R.S.O. 1990, c S.5, sec 2.1 (Can.); Securities Act (Prince
Edward Island), R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c S-3.1, § 13(2) (Can.) (establishing Superintendent of Securities); Act
Respecting the Autorité des Marchés Financiers (Quebec), L.R.Q. 2004, c 37, s 90 (Can.); Securities
Act (Saskatchewan), S.S. 1988-89, c S-42.2, § 3.1(1) (Can.). In the territories, Superintendents of Securities are appointed by their respective Finance Ministers: Securities Act (Northwest Territories),
S.N.W.T. 2008, c 10, § 13 (Can.); Securities Act (Nunavut), S.Nu. 2008, c 12, § 13 (Can.); Securities
Act (Yukon), SY 2007, c 16, § 13 (Can.).
55
See Ian C. Wildgoose Brown, Hard to Swallow: The Canadian Poison Pill from an American
Perspective, 36 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 297, 309 (2012).
56
Committee for the Equal Treatment of Asbestos Minority Shareholders v. Ontario (Securities
Commission), [2001] 2 S.C.R. 132, ¶ 39 (Can.).
57
FAQ, ONT. SEC. COMM’N, http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/19855.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2015).
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trade.”58 Provincial securities regulators may issue cease trade orders
against a company for a variety of reasons, including: failure to or tardy filing of periodic disclosures, filing deficient disclosures, or when the public
interest requires.59 In the hostile takeover context prior to the adoption of
the most recent amendments, if a provincial securities commission decides
a pill is not in the public interest, then it enters a cease trade order preventing a target company’s shareholders from redeeming their share warrants or
purchasing target stock at a discount—this has the effect of allowing the
acquirer to buy the stock on the open market without being subject to the
pill.
Facing the difficulty of coordinating across ten provinces and three territories, the various securities regulators decided to seek uniformity and
formed a cooperative organization called the Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA).60 The CSA describes itself as an “umbrella organization of
Canada’s provincial and territorial securities regulators whose objective is
to improve, coordinate and harmonize regulation of the Canadian capital
markets” through consensus policy decisions.61 Chief among these usuallybut-not-always harmonious policies is National Policy 62-202 – Takeover
Bids – Defensive Tactics,62 which gives regulatory embodiment to the view
that shareholders deserve the right to make a fully informed decision on an
offer.63 While the regulators claim that “authorities appreciate that defensive tactics . . . may be taken by a board of directors of a target company in
a genuine attempt to obtain a better bid,” the National Policy 62-202 makes
clear that “tactics that are likely to deny or limit severely the ability of the
shareholders to respond to a take-over bid or a competing bid may result in
action by the Canadian securities regulatory authorities.”64 As a result, Canadian regulators prefer speedy shareholder votes and auctions, and they
58

Id.
Id. See, e.g., Re KDR Industrials Ltd., 2015 ABASC 551 (Can.) (cease trade order for failure to
file periodic audited and unaudited financial disclosures); Revocation Order, Texas South Energy Inc.,
2014 BCSECCOM 250, ¶ 1 (Can.) (company was cease traded until it filed a prospectus regarding
planned distributions to shareholders); Re Petaquilla Minerals Ltd., 2012 BCSECCOM 442, ¶¶ 40–41
(finding it in the public interest to cease trade a shareholder rights plan).
60
If you are confused, imagine a cross between the SEC and the American National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws—lots of recommendations, none of them binding, but most of
them adopted by most states. The CSA, comprising only ten provinces and three territories in its membership, has a fairly good track record of creating uniform laws. Cf. Wildgoose Brown, supra note 53, at
305 (pointing out that there is significant variation in the application and enforcement of the CSA policy
recommendation even after they are enacted by each member jurisdiction).
61
Overview,
CANADIAN
SECURITIES
ADMINISTRATORS,
http://www.securitiesadministrators.ca/aboutcsa.aspx?id=45 (last visited Nov. 9, 2014).
62
See, e.g., Notice of National Policy 62-202 and Recission of National Policy Statement No. 38
Take-Over Bids – Defensive Tactics (in force as of Aug. 4, 1997), ONT. SEC. COMM’N,
http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/SecuritiesLaw_pol_19970704_62-202_fnp.jsp.
63
Id.
64
Id.
59
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have not hesitated to intervene in takeovers to achieve those goals.65 Furthermore, the Canadian Supreme Court readily defers to the judgments of
the Securities Commissions and has asserted that the various provincial enactments are “clearly intended” to grant Commissions “a very wide discretion,” leaving it up to them “to determine whether and how to intervene in a
particular case.”66
To be sure, there is no such thing as a permanent shareholder rights
plan in Canada. They are temporary and are usually cease traded67 within
forty-two to fifty days of adoption without shareholder approval.68 As we
will see, however, prior to the adoption of Canada’s new amendments,
shareholder adoption of a poison pill is no guarantee of a its continued existence either.
1. The Fiduciary Duties of Canadian Corporate Boards
Before going any further, we must briefly sketch the fiduciary duties
of corporate boards in Canada which underlie all the cases that follow. The
Canadian Supreme Court holds that in exercising their fiduciary duty of
care, directors must “act in the best interests of the corporation,” which
65

See Canadian Securities Administrators, Request for Comments on Proposed National Instrument
62-105 Security Holder Rights Plans, Proposed Companion Policy 62-105CP, and Proposed Consequential Amendments, [2013] 36 OSCB 2643, 2646–47 [hereinafter Proposed NI 62-105 Security Holder Rights Plans], http:// www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/SecuritiesLaw_ni_20130314_62-105_security-holderrights-plan.htm.
66
Committee for the Equal Treatment of Asbestos Minority Shareholders v. Ontario (Securities
Commission), [2001] 2 S.C.R. 132, ¶ 39. Note as well that where American courts have Chevron deference (Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984)) for administrative statutory interpretations
and the Universal Camera “substantial evidence” (Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401
U.S. 402 (1971)) and “hard look” (Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983)) standards of review for agency fact finding. Similarly, Canadian courts
have Dunsmuir deference to both agency interpretations and fact. Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008
SCC 9, [2008] 1 SCR 190, ¶¶ 50–56 (Can.). Recently in McLean v. BCSC, the Canadian Supreme Court
asserted that Dunsmuir deference is to be afforded to securities commissions, McLean v. British Columbia (Securities Commission), 2013 SCC 67, ¶ 21 (reversing a lower court judgment and restoring the
Commission’s order and its construction of § 161(6)(d) of the Securities Act, RSBC 1996, c 418)
(Can.)).
67
Meaning shareholders of the target corporation would be prohibited from obtaining more free or
discounted shares under the terms of the shareholder rights plan.
68
CHRISTOPHER M. BRUNER, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE COMMON-LAW WORLD 87 (2013).
Cf. Drew Hasselback & Barbara Shecter, Regulators in Quebec, rest of Canada break logjam on poisonpill reform, FIN. POST, Sept. 11, 2014, http://business.financialpost.com/2014/09/11/regulators-inquebec-rest-of-canada-break-logjam-on-poison-pill-reform/?__federated=1 (saying fifty to eighty days
is the normal period before cease trading). Additionally, while most shareholder rights plans end or are
cease traded prior to this point, Sec. 636(a) of the Toronto Stock Exchange Manual requires that a plan
must be ratified by shareholders within six months of adoption. See TSX Manual, TORONTO STOCK
EXCHANGE, http://tmx.complinet.com/en/tsx_manual.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2014) (select “Part VI.
Changes in Capital Structure of Listed Issuers”).
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generally means the maximization of value of the corporation.69 The Canadian Supreme Court further instructed in BCE Inc. v. 1976 Debentureholders “that in determining whether [directors] are acting with a view to the
best interests of the corporation it may be legitimate, given all the circumstances of a given case, for the board of directors to consider, inter alia, the
interests of shareholders, employees, suppliers, creditors, consumers, governments and the environment.”70 If anything, this holding seems to say that
corporate boards can consider a wide range of interests in deciding whether
to implement or rescind a shareholder rights plan in the face of a hostile
takeover, and, at the very least, management should have some discretion to
consider the short and long-term interests of the shareholders.
To be sure, the securities commissions have taken the position that if a
board is to use a shareholder rights plan, it may only do so to the extent that
“the rights plan . . . facilitat[es] an auction, encourag[es] competing bids or
otherwise maximiz[es] shareholder value.”71 Of course, the commissions
read this policy to mean that once a rights plan is “unlikely to achieve any
further benefits for shareholders” according to the commission, then the
commission will cease trade the plan.72
2. Criteria for Regulatory Intervention to Override Corporate
Boards That Adopt Takeover Defenses
Cease trading is especially likely when a board adopts a poison pill in
the face of a hostile takeover without conducting a shareholder vote, but
there are multiple factors that the commissions consider in making their determinations.73 The factors securities commissions consider in deciding
whether to cease trade (effectively equivalent to rescindment or redemption
in American parlance) poison pills were enunciated in Royal Host, a joint
decision by the Ontario, Alberta, and British Columbia Securities Commissions.74 The commissions appreciated the difficulty of balancing the objective of National Instrument 62-203 to let shareholders decide whether to accept an offer and allowing management to act according to its perception of
its fiduciary duty.75 Since such balancing is highly fact dependent, the
commissions offered a nonexclusive list of factors to consider, including:
69

People’s Department Stores Inc. v. Wise, [2004] 3 R.C.S. 461, ¶ 42 (Can.).
BCE Inc. v. 1976 Debentureholders, [2008] 3 R.C.S. 560, ¶¶ 80–81 (Can.) (interpreting director
duties under the Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c C-44, s 122(1) (Can.)).
71
Re Baffinland Iron Mines Corp., [2010] 33 OSCB 11385, ¶ 26 (Can.) (emphasis added).
72
Id. ¶ 26 (Can.).
73
Re Canadian Jorex Ltd and Mannville Oil & Gas Ltd., [1992] 15 OSCB 257, 267 (Can.) (applying Royal Host factors). See also Lac Minerals Ltd. and Royal Oak Mines, [1994] 17 OSCB 4963
(Can.).
74
Re Royal Host Real Estate Investment Trust, [1999] 22 OSCB 7819, ¶ 68 (Can.).
75
Id.
70
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whether shareholder pre-approval was obtained; when the plan was adopted; the number of potential offerors and what steps, if any, the target is taking to seek more and their likelihood of success; and “the nature of the bid,
including whether it is coercive or unfair to the shareholders of the target
company.”76
In applying the Royal Host factors, the Ontario Securities Commission
has frequently reiterated that even if shareholders approve a pill:
[A] company’s board of directors is not permitted to maintain a
shareholders’ rights plan indefinitely in order to prevent a bid’s proceeding, but may do so as long as the board is actively seeking alternatives and if there is a real and substantial possibility that the board
can increase shareholder choice and maximize shareholder value.77

This policy ostensibly aims to put shareholders first but it disadvantages the target’s board; notice that the “real and substantial possibility”
language allows the commission free reign to intervene and second guess
the management’s business judgment about what would be best for the value of the company and the shareholders short and long-term interests. Prior
to the adoption of the new regulations, this allowed commissions to second
guess management’s efforts to maximize shareholder value and sometimes
even the wishes of shareholders.
B. Canadian Securities Regulators Go on a Public Interest Power
Spree
The stage is now set for a conflict that throws the Canadian system of
takeover regulation into a tailspin. On one side, 1976 Debentureholders’
says that a corporate directors’ fiduciary duties must embrace not only the
interest of the shareholders but also those of other stakeholders including
employees, bond holders, and the community—in other words consider
long-term interests. On the other side, up until the adoption of this year’s
amendments, the Canadian Securities regulators maintained that corporate
boards must focus only on shareholder wealth maximization, and regulatory
decisions demonstrated that this wealth maximization was paramount even
if it was detrimental of long-term interests and stakeholders.
Consider 1976 Debentureholders seemed to allow for corporate boards
to wait out a hostile takeover if they believed the company could provide
more value to shareholders (and other stakeholders) long-term as an independent entity, even though the waiting game was not in the short-term in76

Id. ¶ 58.
See Re Chapters Inc. and Trilogy Retail Enterprises L.P., [2001] 24 OSCB 1657, 1659 (citing
Re MDC Corporation and Regal Greetings & Gifts Inc., [1994] 17 OSCB 4971),
http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/Proceedings_rad_20010316_chap_312.htm (Can.).
77
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terests of the shareholders. The securities commissions went through the
motions of balancing these considerations, frequently opining “the challenge we face is finding the appropriate balance between permitting the directors to fulfill their duty to maximize shareholder value in the manner
they see fit and protecting the right of the shareholders to decide whether to
tender their shares to the bid.”78 Nevertheless, regulators were only willing
to wait forty to fifty-five days before cease trading a shareholder rights plan
even if the board of directors had legitimate reasons for delaying or defeating a takeover (i.e., better prospects of long-term returns for shareholders
or).79 Even if the target’s shareholders voted to approve of a poison pill,
which is the clearest possible indication shareholders do not want to seek
short-term gains, the commission still cease traded the pills. The commissions were second guessing shareholder decisions about what was in their
own best interest (both in the long and short term).80
There were multiple instances where securities commissions dispensed
with shareholder-approved poison pills. For instance, the Alberta Securities
Commission (ASC) second guessed shareholders facing a hostile takeover
in 1478860 Alberta Ltd. v. Canadian Hydro Developers (“Canadian Hydro”).81 A year prior to the uninvited takeover offer, 72% of Canadian Hydro’s shareholders had voted to adopt a poison pill.82 When the acquirer
sought to cease trade Canadian Hydro’s pill, Canadian Hydro’s board
pointed out that it was actively pursuing alternative bidders and that the bid
was “inadequate” and “opportunistic.”83 Applying the Royal Host factors,84
the ASC initially allowed Canadian Hydro’s pill to remain in place and then
inexplicably reversed itself sixty days later. By cease-trading the Canadian
Hydro’s shareholder rights plan the ASC essentially told the board of Cana78

Re Royal Host Real Estate Investment Trust, [1999] 22 OSCB 7819, ¶ 68 (Can.).
See, e.g., Re Baffinland Iron Mines Corp., [2010] 33 OSCB 11385, ¶ 26 (Can.).
80
The American approach could not be more different. The Delaware Supreme Court has flatly
rejected this kind of searching review “under Unocal . . . because it would involve the court in substituting its judgment for what Is a ‘better’ deal for that of a corporation’s board of directors.” Paramount
Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1153 (Del. 1989).
81
See Re 1478860 Alberta Ltd., 2009 ABASC 448 (Can.).
82
Id. ¶¶ 16, 31.
83
Id. ¶ 32.
84
As a reminder, these include:
[W]hether shareholder approval of the rights plan was obtained; when the plan was adopted; whether there is broad shareholder support for the continued operation of the plan; the
size and complexity of the target company; the other defensive tactics, if any, implemented
by the target company; the number of potential, viable offerors; the steps taken by the target
company to find an alternative bid or transaction that would be better for shareholders; the
likelihood that, if given further time, the target company will be able to find a better bid or
transaction; the nature of the bid, including whether it is coercive or unfair to the shareholders of the target company; the length of time since the bid was announced and made; the likelihood that the bid will not be extended if the rights plan is not terminated.
Royal Host Real Estate Investment Trust, [1999] 22 OSCB 7819, ¶ 58 (emphasis added) (Can.).
79
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dian Hydro that using the tools the shareholders provided was somehow a
violation of fiduciary duty despite the fact that 1976 Debentureholders
broader conception of fiduciary duty should have allowed the board to look
to long-term shareholder wealth maximization.85
Then, without warning, the ASC and Ontario Securities Commission
(OSC) seemed to reverse course by deciding cases whose outcomes could
only be explained if the ASC and OSC were allowing corporate directors to
fulfill their fiduciary duties as conceived in 1976 Debentureholders. First,
in Re Pulse Data Inc., the ASC applied the Royal Host factors and allowed
the target corporation to fend off an unsolicited takeover bid with a poison
pill because the board sought and obtained the informed approval from 98%
of shareholders and even though there were not “imminent” alternative bidders on the horizon.86 Subsequently, in Re Neo Material Technologies Inc,
81% of a target corporation’s shareholders approved a poison pill in the
face of an open offer by a hostile acquirer and the OSC upheld the pill.87 It
opined that shareholder approval of a poison pill should indicate the pill is
in “the bona fide interest of a target’s shareholders”88 and that “shareholder
rights plans may be adopted for the broader purpose of protecting the longterm interests of the shareholders, where, in the directors’ reasonable business judgment, the implementation of a rights plan would be in the best interests of the corporation.”89 It appeared as though the ASC and OSC were
allowing corporate directors to just say no to hostile takeovers, right in line
with Canadian Supreme Court precedent regarding long-term interests.
The doctrinal harmony was not to last. In Lions Gate Entertainment
Corp., a majority of the British Columbia Securities Commission (“BCSC”)
cease traded a rights plan recently approved by an informed majority of Lions Gate shareholders because the pill was not in the public interest.90 Then
the OSC essentially reversed its own holding in Neo stating that the target
board’s views on what was in the best interests of the company was merely
a “secondary consideration,” which the Canadian corporate law community
into angst and confusion over whether boards could consider long-term interests without being second-guessed by regulators acting at the behest of a
minority of shareholders who preferred to pursue short-term profit.
C. Old Habits Dying Hard: Regulators Forced to Propose New
Solutions
Given the regulatory uncertainty, boards and their counsel became un85
86
87
88
89
90

BCE Inc. v. 1976 Debentureholders, [2008] 3 R.C.S. 560, ¶¶ 80–81 (emphasis added) (Can.).
Re Pulse Data Inc., 2007 ABASC 895, ¶ 102 (Can.).
Re Neo Materials Technologies Inc., [2009] 32 OSCB 6941, ¶¶ 26–27 (Can.).
Id. ¶ 69.
Id. ¶ 112.
Re Lions Gate Entertainment Corp, 2010 BCSECCOM 432, ¶ 47 (Can.).
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sure of the extent to which they could rely on a poison pill to fend off hostile bidders even when they had secured shareholder approval. In addition,
the economic climate had deteriorated, and there was tremendous sentiment—particularly in Quebec—that Canadian companies were too easily
acquired and that boards had insufficient tools to fight back.91 (Even as this
Note goes to print the weakness of the Canadian dollar makes Canadian
companies ripe for the picking.92) This was a view shared by some Canadian academics and Canadian law firms.93 Some commentators opposed the
role of regulators in takeovers because “by forcing companies to abandon
takeover defenses after arbitrary periods of time, regulators leave shareholders vulnerable not just to hostile bidders but to unexpected turns of
fate.”94
The perceived problems with the system were so severe that Quebec
was threatening to break ranks with the other provinces to prevent a “hollowing out of corporate Canada” by enacting measures to allow “just say
no” defenses.95 In other words, Quebec was unaccountably demanding to be
more American, adopting the position that boards should have the ability to
unilaterally maintain poison pills in the face of hostile takeovers. Even the
former chairman of the Ontario Securities Commission, Mr. Edward
Waitzer, was on board with the idea, arguing securities commissions should
stop policing shareholder rights plans (and let courts decide) because the
commissions “left Canadian firms largely helpless in the face of U.S. activist investors and hedge funds” and because “nobody really knows what the
law is now.”96 Perhaps the strength of the reaction can be partially explained by an overreaction to dashed expectations that Neo and Pulse’s
91

See e.g., Nicolas Van Praet, ‘Takeovers are Coming’: Some of Quebec’s Biggest Companies
Seem Vulnerable to Foreign Bids, FIN. POST (Nov. 27, 2012, 9:26 PM),
http://business.financialpost.com/2012/11/27/takeovers-are-coming-some-of-quebecs-biggestcompanies-vulnerable-to-foreign-bids/ (raving that “half of Quebec’s 50 biggest publicly traded companies are vulnerable to foreign takeover attempts” and advocating for protectionist anti-takeover policies);
Alexander Schmitt, Why Are Activist Investors Drawn to Canada, MONDAQ (May, 28, 2014),
http://www.mondaq.com/canada/x/316674/Shareholders/Why+Are+Activist+Investors+Drawn+To+Can
ada.
92
Blake’s Mergers & Acquisitions Group, Legal Trends 2016: Mergers & Acquisitions, MONDAQ,
Apr. 4, 2016, Factiva, Doc. No., BBPUB00020160404ec44000e6 (forecasting that foreign acquirers
would be able to “scoop up Canadian assets at bargain prices”).
93
See Barbara Shecter, Poison pill creator notes differences in Canada-U.S. style, FIN. POST, Oct.
9, 2013, at FP2 (quoting M&A panelists remarks that directors should have more leeway in their ability
to resist a deal, rather than be driven solely by share price premia, and that there is a “serious vacuum”
in the rules surrounding takeovers in Canada).
94
Adrian Myers, Regulators should get out of takeovers, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto Can.), June 12,
2014, at B6, 2014 WLNR 15831126.
95
Jeff Gray, Quebec Looks at Going it Alone on Poison Pills, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto Can.), Mar.
15, 2013, at B3, 2013 WLNR 6465284.
96
Jeff Gray, Putting the Poison Back in the Pill, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto Can.), Sept. 7, 2011, at
B8, 2011 WLNR 17654567.
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board-friendly holdings were here to stay,97 but regardless of the cause, Canadian regulators were taking fire from all sides.
To address all these problems, including the massive inefficiencies
created by chronic uncertainty and Quebec’s proposal to import the American “just say no” rule into its takeover regulations,98 the Canadian Securities Administrators drafted amendments to National Instruments 62-203 and
62-105, which respectively regulate takeover bidding and the use of shareholder rights plans (SRPs). These draft amendments were altered slightly
following notice and comment, and they received ministerial approval on
May 5, 2016.99 There are three key changes.
First, the deposit period is increased from 35 to 105 days unless the
target board waives the requirement or announces an alternative transaction.100 Second, the offeror (acquirer, i.e., bidder) cannot take up deposited
securities in a take-over bid unless “more than 50% of the outstanding securities of the class that are subject to the bid, excluding securities beneficially
owned, or over which control or direction is exercised, by the offeror or by
any person acting jointly or in concert with the offeror, have been deposited
under the bid.”101 Third, once these conditions are met, the offeror must
give shareholders who have not yet tendered their shares an additional ten
97

See James C. Davies, Toward a Theory of Revolution, 27 AM. SOC. REV. 5, 6–7 (1962). Davies
posits that revolutions occur when there is a period of positive development where needs (economic,
social, or political) are satisfied at or beyond expectations, followed by a short period of sharp reversal
where community needs and expectations continue to grow as before but are increasingly unfulfilled. Id.
at 6. In our case, Neo and Pulse might have built up expectations that corporate boards might have the
means to fight off a burgeoning wave of M&A activity in Canada, only to have those expectations come
crashing down again. See Jeff Gray, Why targets could get harder to swallow, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto
Can.), Feb. 17, 2010, at B8 (discussing Neo Materials and whether it could signal a move toward allowing boards more discretion in adopting poison pills). Dashed expectations may well have forced regulatory action.
98
In other words, Quebec was threatening to enact a regulation that gave board’s total discretion to
adopt or rescind a poison pill without shareholder approval. See generally Consultation Paper: An Alternative Approach to Securities Regulators’ Intervention in Defensive Tactics, AUTORITÉ DES
MARCHÉS FINANCIERS (Mar. 14, 2013), http://www.lautorite.qc.ca/files/pdf/consultations/juin2013/2013mars14-avis-amf-62-105-cons-publ-en.pdf (weighing in against the ability of regulators to
“cease trade” poison pills that had garnered majority shareholder approval). Of course, shareholders desiring to tender their shares could always vote to replace the anti-takeover board members in a proxy
fight, but that is an expensive and time consuming option.
99
Notice of Ministerial Approval of Amendments to Take-Over Bid Regime and Early Warning
System, 39 OSCB 4187, 4187 (May 5, 2016), https://www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/SecuritiesCategory6/ni_20160505_62-104_amd-take-over-bids.pdf.
100
Changes to National Policy 62-203, Take-Over Bids and Issuer Bids § 2.10, 39 OSCB 4275,
4275 (May 5, 2016); see generally CSA Notice of Amendments to Take-Over Bid Regime – Amendments
to Multilateral Instrument 62-104 Take-Over Bids and Issuer Bids and Changes to National Policy 62203 Take-Over Bids and Issuer Bids and Consequential Amendments, 39 OSCB (Supp-1) (Feb. 25,
2016), http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/Securities-Category6/csa_20160225_62-104_amd-takeover-bids.pdf.
101
National Instrument 62-104, Takeover Bids and Issuer Bids § 2.29.1, 39 OSCB 4228, 4242 (May
5, 2016), http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/Securities-OSCB/20160505_oscb_3918_toc.pdf.
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days to do so.102 Of course, these new take-over regulations only apply
“where the securities subject to the offer to acquire, together with the offeror’s securities, constitute in the aggregate 20% or more of the outstanding
securities” of the target.103
One suggested reform that did not make it into the final regulations
provided that a non-exempt104 “bidder and its joint actors are excluded from
the shareholder vote required to adopt, maintain, amend or terminate a
Rights Plan.”105 This would have meant that a bidder would be unable to
launch a proxy fight to gain control of the board or rescind a pill. Despite
this omission, the three key changes are sufficient to bring clarity and balance to the Canadian hostile takeover regime.
Indeed, the 105-day deposit period means negotiating power shifts towards the target since bidders must secure financing for the entire period,
leaving the target increased opportunity to pursue alternative friendly transactions, decreasing the likelihood hostile takeovers will succeed,106 and in
the energy sector this extended deposit period is particularly target-friendly
since it means that the acquirer will have to worry about exposure to drops
in commodity prices for a much longer period of time.107
More generally, the amendments provide for shareholder selfdetermination while giving boards more time to negotiate and largely eliminating the uncertainty caused by the arbitrary exercise of regulatory public
interest jurisdiction after forty-five to seventy days depending on regulatory
whim.108 Unless the target “engages in conduct that undermines the principles underlying the Proposed [now final] Rule or there is a public interest
rationale for the intervention not contemplated” by the Rules, securities
regulators will in all likelihood not reach the question of whether a pill must
102

Id. § 2.31.1, 39 OSCB 4228, 4243.
Id. § 1.1, 39 OSCB 4228, 4230.
104
Exempt bids are for, among other things, friendly transactions where the board consents to the
takeover; non-exempt bids are the kind that must be made to all shareholders, like hostile takeover bids.
See Securities Act, Multilateral Instrument 62-104 Take-Over Bids and Issuer Bids, § 4.
105
See Canadian Securities Administrators, Proposed NI 62-105 Security Holder Rights Plans, supra note 65, at 2653.
106
Jason A. Saltzman, Canadian Securities Administrators Amend Take-Over Bid Rules, Mondaq,
Apr. 15, 2016, Factiva, Doc. No., BBPUB00020160415ec4f000bu.
107
New Takeover Rules Limiting Poison Pills Will Make it Harder to Bring Hostile Bids,
NATIONAL POST: LEGAL POST (Mar. 1, 2016, 3:03 PM), http://business.financialpost.com/legalpost/new-takeover-rules-limiting-poison-pills-will-make-it-harder-to-bring-hostile-bids.
Companies
have already started to take advantage of their newfound negotiating leverage. See, e.g., Dow Jones Institutional News, Press Release: UrtheCast Announces Adoption of Shareholder Rights Plan, Apr. 6,
2016, Factiva, Doc. No., DJDN000020160406ec46001au; ENP Newswire, Bear Creek Mining Board
Approves Adoption of Shareholder Rights Plan, Apr. 25, 2016, Factiva, Doc. No.,
ENPNEW0020160425ec4p000du.
108
Sean Vanderpol & Edward Waitzer, Regulators Restrain a “Public Interest” Push on Poison
Pills, FP COMMENT (Mar. 8, 2016, 4:14 PM), http://business.financialpost.com/fp-comment/regulatorsrestrain-a-public-interest-push-on-poison-pills.
103
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go since most bidders will either reach agreement with the target in 105
days or abandon their takeover attempt (or not even make the attempt in the
first place).109 Still, some practitioners add that there may be circumstances
where regulators might allow a poison pill to remain past 105 days if a clear
majority of shareholders voted to approve the plan while the bid was pending or perhaps where there is an eleventh-hour revelation justifying giving
the target more time.110 In other words, the new regulations reemphasize the
notion that Canadian law gives corporate boards the ability to “just say
slow” rather than “just say no,” giving them leeway to maximize shareholder value without stymieing the market for corporate control.111
This resolves the longstanding discrepancy between the logic of the
Canadian Supreme Court in 1976 Debentureholders, which broadly defined
the fiduciary duties of directors (allowing them to consider long-term interests and affording a modicum of deference to their judgment), and the official policies of the provincial securities regulators which, up until now,
would essentially second guess any attempt to prevent shareholders from
voting on a takeover bid. Under the new rules, the Neo, Pulse, Lions Gate,
and Baffinland cases would never have occurred because directors would
have had 105 days to negotiate a deal or seek renewal of the pill from
shareholders—no need to litigate abstruse questions of fiduciary duty.
From the perspective of the shareholder-primacy camp, these proposed
rules are what they have always wanted, and roughly approximate what Justice Strine suggested should be a compromise position for the American
system. The proposed rules involve a limited poison pill subject to shareholder approval and allow for the target board to wage a proxy fight to
“convince stockholders that they are better off if the bid is rejected.”112 By
the same token, Bainbridge and Strine would probably both suffer migraines at the thought that shareholders could vote at any time to rescind a
pill, but that is the cost of compromise. While one might argue that this
makes minority shareholders subject to the whims of an entrenched board,
this is only true until the next annual board election or the expiry of the deposit period.
There was one missed opportunity, however. The final amendments
did not follow through on proposed amendments’ efforts to combat “empty

109

Canadian Securities Administrators, Proposed NI 62-105 Security Holder Rights Plans, supra
note 65, at 2650.
110
Drew Hasselback, New Takeover Rules Limiting Poison Pills Will Make it Harder to Bring Hostile
Bids,
NATIONAL
POST:
LEGAL
POST
(Mar.
1,
2016,
3:03
PM),
http://business.financialpost.com/legal-post/new-takeover-rules-limiting-poison-pills-will-make-itharder-to-bring-hostile-bids.
111
Ruben Zaramian, Maximizing Shareholder Value Through Process: Canada’s New Take-Over
Bid Rules, Mondaq, Mar. 9, 2016, Factiva, Doc. No., BBPUB00020160309ec39000y1.
112
See Strine, supra note 15, at 459–61.
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voting” tactics that had so vexed Hu and Black.113 This is arguably a serious
problem in Canada. For instance, TELUS Corporation (a giant Canadian
telecom firm) was thwarted in its efforts to convert its non-voting shares into voting shares because a New York hedge fund bought up a combination
of shares and derivatives such that it could block the conversion and profit
as the non-voting share price fell while not holding any actual economic interest in TELUS.114 The proposed amendments included provisions counting derivatives and “equity equivalent derivatives” for both mandatory voting and Early Warning Reporting thresholds, but the final rules did not
include these changes.115
Nevertheless, Canada’s proposed amendments allow boards to adopt
poison pills and retain them for a useful period of time such that negotiating
power is increased while shareholders retain their right to vote on a takeover transaction at auction should they so desire.
IV. THE AMERICAN SYSTEM
A. The American Legal Apparatus: Delaware Reigns Supreme
State statutes and judicially crafted rules align to make the American
system of takeover regulation so board-centric as to effectively deny shareholders the right to vote on takeover transactions without board approval.
This is because the American system of takeover regulation is informed
primarily by state—Delaware—corporate law and SEC regulations. Directors’ duties of care are defined by state statute, but unlike in Canada, there
is no regulator with wide-ranging “public interest jurisdiction” to step in
and enforce that duty of care, let alone bring entrenched or corrupt management to heel on behalf of beleaguered shareholders. Instead, shareholders must file a formal suit in court, which almost always defers to manage113

Canadian Securities Administrators, ONT. SEC. COMM’N, CSA Notice 62-307: Update on Proposed Amendments to Multilateral Instrument 62-104 Take-Over Bids and Issuer Bids, National Instrument 62-103 Early Warning System and Related Take-Over Bid and Insider Reporting Issues and National
Policy
62-203
Take-Over
Bids
and
Issuer
Bids
(Oct.
10,
2013),
http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/Securities-Category6/csa_20141010_62-307_proposedadmendments-multilateral-instrument.pdf.
114
See Letter from Monique Mercier, TELUS Chief Legal Officer to the Ontario Securities Commission and Autoritê des marchés financiers regarding CSA Request for Comment on Proposed National Instrument 62-203 (July 7, 2013), http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/Securities-Category6Comments/com_20130702_62-203_teluscorp.pdf. Cf. Letter from James Trotter, Council of Institutional
Investors, to the OSC and AMF regarding CSA Request for Comment on Proposed National Instrument
62-203
(July
11,
2013),
http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/Securities-Category6Comments/com_20130711_62-203_counselofii.pdf (claiming that empty voting poses no problem at all
and that the CSA would be ill-advised to require the disclosure of derivatives).
115
McCarthy Tetrault LLP, Canada’s Early Warning Rules Get Tougher in May, MONDAQ, Mar. 9,
2016, Factiva, Doc. No. BBPUB00020160309ec39000vv.
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ment under the “business judgment rule.”116 Hence, state courts are not
nearly as aggressive as Canada’s regulators have been.
When the Delaware Chancery Courts confront a board’s decision to
resist a hostile takeover, the business judgment rule remains a nearly impenetrable defense. The business judgment rule forms the basis of the Unocal test which shields nearly any defensive tactic, including poison pills.117
To prevent the invalidation of a defensive measure, the board of directors
need only demonstrate that it “had reasonable grounds for believing that a
danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed” and that its “defensive
response was reasonable [and proportionate] in relation to the threat
posed.”118 This deferential standard has a wrinkle in the form of Blasius Industries, Inc. v. Atlas Corp., where, “under very unusual facts” the Delaware Supreme Court “held that the board of directors must provide a ‘compelling justification’ for its actions where the board acted ‘for the primary
purpose of interfering with the effectiveness of a stockholder vote.’”119
However, Blasius has been subsequently interpreted to require that directors
have the sole, specific intent to deprive shareholders of the right to vote on
a takeover bid, which explains why nobody has successfully used Blasius to
get a Delaware court to force the rescission of a shareholder rights plan.120
Hence, Delaware courts and a supermajority of other state courts apply the
Unocal standard, meaning poison pills can remain active indefinitely without any need for shareholder approval until the next annual board election.
Board entrenchment is made worse by the default allowance of classified boards under Delaware law, which makes it impossible for an acquirer
to gain control of the board without going through two years of proxy
fights.121 When Unocal and staggered boards are considered together, they
116

The business judgment rule defers to the “managerial prerogatives” of directors by creating a
“presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company.”
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984), overruled on grounds not relevant here by Brehm v.
Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 255 (Del. 2000).
117
Unitrin, Inc. v. American Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1373 (Del. 1993) (citing Unocal Corp. v.
Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985)).
118
Id.
119
Third Point LLC v. Ruprecht, No. CIV.A. 9469-VCP, 2014 WL 1922029, at *15 (Del. Ch. May
2, 2014) (quoting Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch.1988)). The reader
may be interested to know that Third Point involved the takeover of the venerable auction house Sotheby’s. For additional analysis, see Michael O’Bryan & Enrico Granata, Delaware Court Upholds Poison
Pill in Response to Activist Accumulations, 25 WESTLAW J. M&A 1 (July 25, 2014) (discussing a twotier trigger shareholder rights plan and the limits of board discretion under Unocal).
120
See Michal Barzuza, The State of State Antitakeover Law, 95 VA. L. REV. 1973, 2015–17 (2009).
Barzuza indicates that Michigan, Nevada, New York, and Massachusetts have used Blasius or some other enhanced fiduciary standard when striking down the more extreme versions of poison pills (i.e. “dead
hand” pills, which can only be rescinded by those directors who implemented them). Id.
121
See DGCL, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(d) (West 2014) (allowing boards of up to three classes).
The effect of this provision of the DGCL is to elect the board like the United States Senate. Only a few
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have the effect of allowing American boards to unilaterally implement poison pills in the face of a takeover, and shareholders have no recourse absent
a proxy fight.122 Unfortunately, the proxy fight itself is also a relatively ineffective route for shareholders to use to attempt to rescind a pill since the
target board has several ways to tilt the process in its favor including the
ability to spend corporate funds on winning the board election. A prospective acquirer has no recourse in court against an unfairly rigged proxy fight
unless success is “not realistically attainable.”123 This is tantamount to no
recourse at all.
Taken together, the American policies make hostile takeovers practically impossible, reducing shareholder value.124 Indeed, the burdens of
completing a hostile takeover are so high that no hostile bidder has succeeded in a hostile takeover of a company with a staggered board and an active shareholder rights plan since at least 1996!125 Plus, the litigation costs
involved in a hostile takeover and the ensuing proxy fight make the American system of takeovers very expensive relative to its peer nations.126 This
seats are up at any one time. Also like the U.S. Senate, under the DGCL, there can be a maximum of
three classes of directors, so each class must be up for election once in three years. From the perspective
of an acquirer, this is problematic because it means that he must win board elections two years in a row
to gain control of the board and rescind the poison pill. Also, DGCL, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(k)(1)
(West 2014) sets as a default rule that unless the certificate of incorporation provides otherwise, directors on classified boards are removable only “for cause.” Under the Canada Business Corporations Act,
R.S.C. 1985, c C-44 (“CBCA”), sec 109(1) (Can.), “the shareholders of a corporation may by ordinary
resolution at a special meeting remove any director or directors from office.” Since CBCA § 2 defines
“ordinary resolution” as a majority vote, all directors of businesses incorporated under the CBCA are
subject to removal without cause by majority vote at any time. The total opposite of the Delaware default rules for Articles of Incorporation.
122
In states that follow Unocal, shareholders have been unable to use bylaw amendments to forbid
board adoptions of poison pills, largely because boards can unilaterally amend bylaws. See MODEL BUS.
CORP. ACT, § 10.05 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2006); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b) (West 2014). Oklahoma
was the temporary exception. In 1999 its Supreme Court held that “under Oklahoma law there is no exclusive authority granted boards of directors to create and implement shareholder rights plans” against
the wishes of a majority of shareholders, but shareholders rights to “propose bylaws which restrict board
implementation of shareholder rights plans” exist only if “the certificate of incorporation does not provide otherwise.” Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters Gen. Fund v. Fleming Companies, Inc., P.2d 907, 908 (Okla.
1999). Unfortunately for shareholder rights advocates, the effect of this holding was easily evaded because every subsequently incorporated entity need only include a charter provision denying shareholders
the right to enact pill-defeating bylaws.
123
Selectica, Inc. v. Versata Enters., Inc., 5 A.3d 586, 601 (Del. 2010). See also Paul H. Edelman &
Randall S. Thomas, Selectica Resets the Trigger on the Poison Pill: Where Should the Delaware Courts
Go Next?, 87 IND. L.J. 1087 (2012).
124
See Comment & Schwert, supra note 40, at 43; Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 39, at 415–17.
125
See R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI & JESSIE A. FINKELSTEIN, DEL. L. OF CORP. & BUS. ORG. § 4.6 (R.
Franklin Balotti & Jesse A. Finkelstein eds. 2006); Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 39, at 413 (citing Lucian A. Bebchuk, Why Firms Adopt Antitakeover Arrangements, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 713–753 (2003)).
This assumes that the corporation has three classes of directors on the board, the maximum allowable
under Delaware corporate law. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(d) (2010).
126
See Armour et al., supra note 8, at 1749 (comparing American and British leading M&A law
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state of affairs has all the effects that the law and economics academics
warn of, including decreased firm economic performance and persistently
incompetent management.
B. Curbing American Excess
Adopting the Canadian rules would restore shareholder’s ability to
have a meaningful say on takeover transactions while maintaining a board’s
ability to resist coercive hostile takeovers indefinitely. Recall that the proposed Canadian rule would allow boards unilateral discretion to adopt an
SRP for 105 days and potentially longer with shareholder approval. If
adopted in the American context, the rule would have positive effect by reempowering shareholders. Since shareholders need not control the board to
rescind127 (American for “cease trade”) the poison pill, the acquirer can take
up enough shares to make control all but certain in the next two elections.128
A director faced with all but certain defeat in two years will probably see he
is better served by a quick exit than remaining on the board of a company of
which he is destined to lose—perhaps this might even make would-be holdouts more likely to work cooperatively with the acquirer in the first place.
In addition, even though America does not benefit from the Canadian
rules that make classified boards removable at any time by majority vote,129
an outright ban on classified boards might not be necessary for the Canadian 90-day rule to effectively allow for an acquirer to gain control of the
board for most corporations. Institutional shareholders have taken significant strides using ordinary shareholder voting procedures to amend corporate charters and bylaws to eliminate classified boards in large companies,
reducing the number of S&P 500 companies with classified boards from
303 to 126 between 1999 and 2012.130 Fifty-two more of the S&P 500 defirms to reveal the American lawyers generated more than double the revenue of their British counterparts).
127
This is American for “cease trade.” The technical distinction is that when a board rescinds a pill,
it usually must pay the shareholders some nominal consideration in exchange for them surrendering their
rights to buy shares. WILLIAM J. CARNEY, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 352
(3d ed. 2011). However, when a Securities Commissioner “cease trades” the pill, the warrants simply
cannot be exercised—no consideration changes hands. If shareholders use the Canadian Rule to “rescind” a pill, it is likely that no consideration will be paid since the shareholders are essentially waiving
their rights under the plan.
128
This obviates the need to strain existing doctrine by treating a loss in a proxy contest as a referendum on the pill. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian, The Powerful
Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887, 944–49
(2002) (arguing that Delaware courts should interpret the “reasonableness” prong of the Unocal test such
that a loss in a proxy contest should be sufficient grounds to rescind a pill over management’s objections).
129
See Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c C-44, secs 2, 109(1) (Can.) (providing
that directors are removable by ordinary shareholder resolution which requires a mere majority vote).
130
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Scot Hirst & June Rhee, Towards the Declassification of S&P 500 Boards, 3
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classified their boards in 2013, and twenty-four further companies agreed in
2014 to use annual elections for all directors.131 In light of these advancements, the shareholders in more American companies than ever would be
able to use the Canadian rule exactly as designed—the tendering of shares
would occur simultaneously with the change of control.
One of the criticisms leveled at the Canadian rule was that it would increase proxy fights and litigation surrounding them.132 While this may be
true, it cannot be said that American firms would suffer any net increase in
their legal bills by eliminating an entire subject of litigation. Even if there is
an increase in litigation over proxy fights, at worst, the only dollars spent
will be those that have otherwise been dedicated toward attacking or defending the shareholder rights plan.133 Plus, any attempts at thwarting voting during the proxy fight might actually breathe a little vitality into the
Blasius standard, and boards might discover that any attempt to restrict the
shareholder franchise will be met with far less deference than their former
attempts to implement or retain poison pills.134
Adopting the Canadian rules would eliminate protracted court battles
over the legality of various types of pills since they can be easily removed
at the end of the deposit period—and if they cannot, it is only because the
shareholders have said so. For instance, in AirGas it took sixteen months of
trials and appeals for a Delaware Chancery court to determine that a poison
pill could not be redeemed.135 The Canadian rule likely would have allowed
a sufficient number PeopleSoft shareholders to vote to rescind the PeopleSoft’s pill and tender their shares without having to endure an eight-

HARV. BUS. L. REV. 157, 165 (2013) (citing Classified Boards Year Over Year, SHARKREPELLENT,
http://sharkrepellent.net (last visited Feb. 1, 2013)).
131
121 Companies Agreed to Move Towards Annual Elections, HARV. SHAREHOLDER RTS. PROJ.,
http://srp.law.harvard.edu/companies-entering-into-agreements.shtml (last visited Feb. 17, 2015).
132
See Barry Critchley, Activism, Takeover Rules Can Co-Exist, NAT’L POST, Nov. 14, 2014, at 2,
2014 WLNR 32018919.
133
The nature of the Canadian regulation also begets efficiency and cost effectiveness. Implementing the 90-day brightline rule would require adjudicating the adequacy of adherence to an easily testable
criterion, rather than nebulous musings on “public interest” or even “business judgment” standards. See
Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 387–88 (1985) (arguing that brightline rules
“reduce the cost of communicating” facilitating “communications and transactions”); Louis Kaplow,
Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992) (noting that rules are more
efficient and appropriate for situations where the conduct governed occurs frequently, as it will with the
90-day rule).
134
See Carmody v. Toll Bros., 723 A.2d 1180, 1186–87 (Del. Ch. 1998) (discussing permissible and
impermissible ways corporate boards might attempt to interfere with proxy contests).
135
Airgas, Inc. v. Air Products & Chemicals, Inc., No. CIV.A. 5817-CC, 2010 WL 3960599 (Del.
Ch. Oct. 8, 2010), rev’d, 8 A.3d 1182, 1185 (Del. 2010); Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16
A.3d 48, 57 (Del. Ch. 2011) (noting this was the most court time a poison pill case had received in Delaware history). See generally Steven M. Davidoff, A Case Study: Air Products v. Airgas and the Value
of Strategic Judicial Decision-Making, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 502, 547 (2012).
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een-month slog to the finish line.136 And the Canadian Rule would likely
have allowed Circon shareholders to bypass a staggered board and poison
pill to at least tender their shares to U.S. Surgical in 1996 rather than be
forced to accept a deal for 17% less two years later.137 In each of these cases, entrenched boards were holding out for unreasonably long periods of
time while incurring substantial litigation and attorney fees. The Canadian
Rule, with its simple 105-day limit, would do away with much of this
deadweight.138 Of course, if the pill remained at the end of the 105-day period, a judge (like the Canadian securities commission) would have to determine whether the pill should stay or go, but after the board has had such
a long time to find alternative transactions it will be much easier to assess
whether the board is acting to maximize shareholder value or merely to entrench and enrich itself.
The Canadian Rule also eliminates any possibility of “substantive coercion.”139 Since shares cannot be tendered to acquirer under the rule for
105 days, there is no risk shareholders will sell their shares lemming-like
without exacting a control premium because the board has plenty of time to
inform them of the facts and prevent an unjustified dash for the exits. By
allowing corporate boards to adopt poison pills, the Canadian Rule also
helps boards avoid the problem of divided economic and control rights in
shares. Since the a poison pill can have triggering threshold140 (i.e., 5% of
all outstanding shares) at a level so low as to prevent an acquirer from gaining substantial control of the company, the pill can prevent an activist investor from gaining enough control to engage in arbitrage.141
136

See Paul R. La Monica, Finally, Oracle to Buy PeopleSoft, CNN/MONEY (Dec. 13, 2004, 12:53
PM), http://money.cnn.com/2004/12/13/technology/oracle_peoplesoft/; David Bank, After 18-Month
Battle, Oracle Finally Wins Over PeopleSoft, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 14, 2004, 12:01 AM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB110293586982698273.
137
See Bebchuk, The Case Against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers, supra note 42, at 1033; U.S.
Surgical’s
Offer
for
Circon
Becomes
Hostile,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
17,
1996,
http://www.nytimes.com/1996/08/17/business/us-surgical-s-offer-for-circon-becomes-hostile.html.
138
And if the shareholders felt like paying for a lengthier test of wills at the negotiating table, then
they remain totally free to maintain the shareholder rights plan.
139
See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1153 n.17 (Del. 1990), citing
with approval to Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware’s Intermediate Standard for Defensive Tactics: Is There Substance to Proportionality Review?, 44 BUS. LAW. 247, 267–68 (1989) (defining “substantive coercion” as “the risk that shareholders will mistakenly accept an underpriced offer
because they disbelieve management’s representations of intrinsic value”).
140
If an acquirer buys more shares after reaching this level of ownership in the company, then
shareholders either receive shares or the rights to purchase shares (in accordance with the terms of the
rights plan).
141
Additionally, if the United States were to adopt the Canadian enhanced disclosure rules, that
would have the added effect of thwarting arbitrageurs who exploit the ability to divide economic and
control rights in shares. The United States does not currently require disclosure of these “hidden ownership” interests, but the new Rule in Proposed National Instrument 62-103 would help eliminate this
problem. See Michael C. Schouten, The Case for Mandatory Ownership Disclosure, 15 STAN. J.L. BUS.
& FIN. 127 (2010) (arguing for disclosure regulations to prevent abuse of “hidden ownership” and “emp-
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Given the foregoing, it seems it would be entirely beneficial for the
United States or each of its states to adopt the new Canadian Rule regarding
poison pills.
V. TAKEOVER REGULATION AND DEFENSES IN THE UNITED
KINGDOM
The defining feature of the United Kingdom’s system of takeover regulation is that it strongly favors acquirers and shareholders. This has led to
concerns that the system does not give corporate boards sufficient leverage
to maximize shareholder value. With minor changes, the Canadian proposed rules could be adopted in the United Kingdom to increase board leverage while maintaining shareholder primacy overall.
A. The British Public–Private Regulatory System
For historical reasons, the takeover regime of the United Kingdom,
when compared with the United States and Canada, favors shareholders to a
much greater degree.142 This is mostly because it evolved out of the interwoven relationships of major financial institutions and institutional shareholders, which coalesced around the formation of the Takeover Panel.143
Not surprisingly, given who developed the system, the United Kingdom has
“very few legal sanctions to control the manner in which [companies] are
bought, sold, and dismembered.”144
Generally speaking, listed public companies are subject to the oversight of The Takeover Panel, a public-private hybrid regulatory board. In
this respect, the United Kingdom is much closer to Canada than the United
States because British courts defer almost completely to the Panel as the
designated tribunal.145 The Panel’s activities, in turn, are governed by The

ty voting” interests); Jordan M. Barry, et al., On Derivatives Markets and Social Welfare, 99 VA. L.
REV. 1103, 1156–59 (2013) (outlining the level of disclosure necessary to stop arbitrage). For a perspective on what levels of disclosure might be required to solve the hidden ownership problem throughout
Europe, see Wolf-Georg Ringe, Hedge Funds and Risk Decoupling: The Empty Voting Problem in the
European Union, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1027, 1087–99 (2013).
142
See Armour et al., supra note 8, at 1767–77 (2007) (explaining that the relatively high level of
institutional share ownership early on in the U.K. allowed such investors to create a system of selfregulation favoring their interests as shareholders and repel government attempts at regulation).
143
Id.
144
See NILUFER VON BISMARCK, CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS AND MERGERS IN THE UNITED
KINGDOM ¶ 22 (2013).
145
The High Court of Appeal observed that it could interfere with Takeover Panel decisions only “if
there has been illegality (the panel has misdirected itself in law), irrationality (no reasonable panel could
have reached such a decision) or procedural impropriety (failure by the panel to conform to the rules
governing its own conduct or to basic rules of natural justice).” R v. Panel on Takeovers and Mergers ex
p Datafin [1987] 1 QB 817, 822 (appeal taken from Eng.).
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City Code on Takeover and Mergers, which it promulgates and enforces.
The Panel had been a completely private entity since its establishment
in 1968, but Parliament clothed the Panel with de jure authority by statute
in 2006, making it a privately administered public regulatory body—Panel
members are either current or former practitioners and are selected by both
the Panel and financial institutions.146 Section 804 of the Companies Act
gives The Panel the extraordinarily broad authority to “do anything that it
considers necessary or expedient for the purposes of, or in connection with,
its functions,” including amending the Takeover Code at will.147
Practitioners have quipped the Panel’s first rule is only “thou shalt do
what thou ist told,”148 but any comparison to the Canadian securities administrators would be inapt. Though the Panel may regulate in any manner it
desires by fiat, the Panel’s historical practice and current view is that it
should not consider “wider questions of public interest” or exercise what
Canadian regulators would call “public interest” jurisdiction.149 The Panel
confines itself to ensuring the orderly acquisition and sale of companies
while preventing target shareholders from undue prejudice.150
The Panel’s self-defined role is embodied and effectuated through The
Takeover Code,151 the animating principle of which is that all classes of the
target company shareholders must receive equal treatment and adequate information to make an informed decision on the bid, and that the target’s
management must act in the best interests of the company and cannot deny
shareholders the right to accept or reject a bid.152 Most importantly for our
146

See The Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 763 (U.K.), Directive of the European Parliament and of
the Council on takeover bids (2004/25/EC), and the implementing Council Regulation (EC) No.
139/2004;
Panel
Membership,
THE
TAKEOVER
PANEL,
http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/structure/panel-membership (last visited Nov. 7, 2014) (explaining
that the panel comprises thirty-five members of which twenty are selected by the Panel and of which
eleven are selected by major institutions like the British Bankers Association and the Association of Investment Companies).
147
It should be noted that any of the Panel’s rules can be waived at its discretion, but it will readily
refuse waivers if any shareholders will be prejudiced, in accordance with General Principle 1 of the
Code.
148
MCCLURE NAISMITH, CHRISTOPHER J. STENNING, & ANDREW G. WILLIAMSON, Securities Law
in the U.K., in INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES LAW HANDBOOK 641 (Michael Best & Jean-Luc Soulier
eds., 3d ed. 2010). There is substantial truth to this statement since all persons and entities under the
jurisdiction of the Takeover Panel and the Takeover Code must comply with the Code in both letter and
spirit, even in situations the code does not expressly cover. See VON BISMARCK, supra note 144, ¶ 652
(2013).
149
See About the Panel, THE TAKEOVER PANEL, http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/structure (last
visited Nov. 7, 2014).
150
Id.
151
THE PANEL ON TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS, THE TAKEOVER CODE (2013) [hereinafter
TAKEOVER CODE], http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk (follow “Download Code as PDF” hyperlink).
152
See NAISMITH, supra 148, at 641. Additionally, the Panel forbids efforts to create “false markets
. . . in the securities of the offeree company, of the offeror company or any other company concerned by
the bid” to artificially cause a rise or fall in share prices. THE TAKEOVER CODE, Gen. Princ. 4. This
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purposes, Rule 21.1 of the Takeover Code flatly forbids defensive
measures—like poison pills—“during the course of an offer, or even before
the date of the offer if the board of the [target] has reason to believe that a
bona fide offer might be imminent, without the approval of the shareholders
in general meeting.”153
Rule 25 requires the target board to send a circular to its shareholders
containing its views on “the offer and the [acquirer]’s plans for the company and its employees” (along with impartial, independently prepared profit
forecasts and asset valuations).154 Occasionally these disclosures and circulars might be used as a defensive tactic, but their effectiveness is questionable.155 In light of the board’s dearth of defensive options, it logically follows that it has less leverage to ensure that shareholders get the maximum
value for their shares, less time to make their case to the shareholders and
search out value-enhancing alternative transactions.156 Since there are virtuserves to protect both the target and its shareholders.
153
TAKEOVER CODE, supra note 150, R. 21.1. Additionally, the “Duty to promote the success of the
company” is codified in more general terms in The Companies Act, 2006, c. 2, § 172 (U.K.). See also
Hogg v Cramphorn Ltd [1967] Ch. 254, 261 (holding directors could not issue shares for the sole purpose of preventing a hostile takeover).
154
TAKEOVER CODE, supra note 150, R. 25. The only other known defense, aside from disseminating information to shareholders, is to coax another government entity or agency to initiate a judicial or
administrative proceeding or investigation. See VON BISMARK, supra note 143, ¶¶ 767–70. In the case of
Farmers Insurance, Farmers a subsidiary of B.A.T., lobbied U.S. state regulators to persuade them they
had jurisdiction over the takeover launched against B.A.T. and that the takeover required their consent
before it could be completed. Panel Statement 1989/20 (Sept. 15, 1989) re. B.A.T. Industries, at 1,
http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2008/12/1989-21.pdf. While this maneuver
effectively delayed the deal for nearly a year, the Panel concluded it did not violate the Code. The key
factor, however, was that the state regulators had taken the initiative to participate in reviewing the
transaction. In another case earlier that year, however, the Panel held that a target firm violated the Code
by engaging in impermissible defensive activities by suing under Section 7 of the Clayton Act to procure
an injunction against the takeover. Panel Statement 1989/07 (May 9, 1989) re. Consolidated Gold Fields
Plc., at 2, http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2008/12/1989-07.pdf. Even though
Section 7 allowed private companies to bring suits to enforce the antitrust provisions of the Act, neither
federal nor state officials had intervened to stop the transaction. Id. at 8–9. The Panel reasoned that the
target alone was causing the delay by injunction, so it ordered the target firm “to discontinue its litigation forthwith, unless it is approved by shareholders.” Id. at 24. In other words, a government apparatus
must intervene before the Panel will brook delay.
155
See Acting in the interests of the company as a whole, 3 PALMER’S COMPANY LAW 12.299.28
(2015). The board of directors might be able to avoid contravening General Principle 3 and Rule 21 using such disclosures by arguing “that a particular bid is at a fair price but that it is not in the interests of
the company as a whole.” Id. This strategy was employed by Manchester United, “when the board, consistently with its duties under the Code, advised shareholders that the price offered by [acquirer] was
fair, but also stated that the financing structure meant that it was not in the interests of the company.” Id.
156
That is not to say that the U.K. system does not treat shareholders fairly, only that it might not
afford shareholders the most value per share in a takeover as would the U.S. or Canadian system. Indeed, there are several shareholder protective provisions. For instance, Rule 9 requires an acquirer to
make a cash or cash alternative offer if its interests in the target’s shares reach or exceed a 30% voting
stake in the target; all shareholders must receive the highest price the acquirer paid for such shares in the
last year. TAKEOVER CODE, supra note 150, R. 9. Additionally, “when interests in shares carrying 10%
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ally no methods by which a U.K. firm may defend itself, particularly thorny
situations can arise in tender offers.
B. Cadbury’s Takeover Reveals Cracks in the System
Consider the takeover of Cadbury by Kraft Foods.157 In 2010, Kraft
Foods acquired the iconic British confectionary company Cadbury, much to
the dismay of the British public.158 To allay concerns that the acquisition
would cause job losses in the United Kingdom, Kraft promised in its takeover proposal and in its testimony before the committee that it would keep
open its factory in Somerdale.159 Kraft later reneged on this promise, to the
outrage of the public and Westminster.160 The committee remonstrated
Kraft’s “cynical ploy,” and then sought answers.161 Echoing concerns that
have been raised by Hu and Canadian regulators, the committee opined
“that the takeover of Cadbury by Kraft was ultimately decided by institutional investors motivated by short-term profits rather than those investors
who had the company’s long-term interests at heart.”162 The committee
suggested that only direct intervention by either the government or the Panel would be sufficient to overcome the problematic institutional shareholder

or more of the voting rights of a class have been acquired by an offeror (i.e. a bidder) in the offer period
and the previous twelve months, the offer must include a cash alternative for all shareholders of that
class at the highest price paid by the offeror in that period. Id. at R. 11. Further, if an offeror acquires
for cash any interest in shares during the offer period, a cash alternative must be made that price at
least.” Id. Taken together with Rule 1, Rules 9 and 11 ensure all shareholders get the same deal regardless of when they sell their shares, but the rules do not ensure they get the best possible deal because
they do not allow the board sufficient independent negotiating leverage.
157
BUSINESS, INNOVATION, AND SKILLS COMMITTEE, MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS AND TAKEOVERS:
THE TAKEOVER OF CADBURY BY KRAFT, 2009–10, H.C. 234 (U.K.) [hereinafter BIS COMMITTEE
REPORT], http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmbis/234/234.pdf.
158
Rupert Steiner, 400 Cadbury’s workers sacked after Kraft confirms factory will close just ONE
WEEK after U.S. firm promised to keep it open, DAILYMAIL.COM (London), Feb. 10, 2010,
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1249728/Cadbury-sacks-400-workers-Kraft-breaks-promiseshut-factory.html. Public outcry regarding the deal, particularly Kraft’s reneging on its promise to protect jobs, spurred MPs to haul Kraft executives before the Commons business select committee just two
months after the merger deal closed. Zoe Wood, Kraft to shed 200 British jobs but denies breaching nocuts
pledge
to
MPs,
THEGUARDIAN.COM
(London),
Dec.
6,
2011,
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2011/dec/06/kraft-axes-200-uk-jobs. These losses mounted
through 2011. Id. The discontent was heard all the way across the Atlantic, too. See Alistair MacDonald,
Foreign Takeovers Take a Toll in U.K.—Kraft’s Acquisition of Cadbury Feeds Discontent That Nation
Is Losing Locally Controlled Industries, WALL STREET JOURNAL, Jan. 27, 2010, at A11.
159
BIS COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 157, ¶¶ 1–5.
160
Id. ¶¶ 19–20. One publication noted the takeover had “attracted an amazing amount of vitriol.”
Peter Crush & Jonathan Chocqueel-Mangan, Heading for meltdown?, HUMAN RESOURCES, June 2010,
at 26.
161
BIS COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 157, ¶¶ 1–5.
162
Id. at 30.
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behavior caused by short-term financial incentives.163
UK Business Secretary Lord Mandelson echoed the Committee’s concerns in a speech to business community leaders in early 2010.164 He noted
that increased public ownership of shares through retirement accounts
means average shareholders ignore corporate governance while fund managers make all the decisions about buying and selling stocks.165 Like many
academics, Lord Mandelson warned that fund managers’ “incentives may
require them to deliver returns on short timeframes, even if they manage
pensions for people whose key interest lies in the long term.”166 The Secretary highlighted the risks posed by linking CEO compensation to short-term
gains in share prices and making share price increases “a corporate strategy
in itself.”167 In large part, Lord Mandelson argued that “rewarding clever
readers of the market more than industrial innovation, quality management,
or entrepreneurial skill” does not build companies in the manner that is best
for Britain.168 The Business Secretary claimed that the 2006 Companies Act
was designed “to encourage the right kind of long-termism among company
directors,” and called for “an equivalent long-termism among company
owners, especially institutional shareholders.”169 His recommendations included raising the approval threshold for a change of control transaction to
two-thirds of voting shares and imposing a duty of stewardship on fund
managers requiring them to consider the long-term interests of the companies in which they have invested.170
Surprisingly, the Government took no actions in response to the findings by the Committee on Business, Innovation, and Skills or Lord Mandelson’s proposals. Instead, the Takeover Panel publicly censured Kraft,171 enhanced disclosure requirements, and created a “put up or shut up” rule.172
163

Id. at 30–31.
Lord Mandelson, Speech at the Annual Trade and Industry Dinner, Mansion House (Mar. 1,
2010),
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100304014526/http://www.bis.gov.uk/mansionhouse-speech. See also Tim Webb, Lord Mandelson Calls for Overhaul of Takeover Rules, GUARDIAN
(Mar. 1, 2010, 5:30 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/business/2010/mar/01/lord-mandelson-mansionhouse-keynote (reporting that “Business secretary says . . . that directors should act more like ‘stewards’
than ‘auctioneers.’”).
165
Id.
166
Id. This view is shared by many. See, e.g., Coffee & Darius, supra note 31, at 4; Allaire & Dauphin, supra note 32, at 6; Strine, supra note 15, at 455.
167
Lord Mandelson, Speech at the Annual Trade and Industry Dinner, Mansion House (Mar. 1,
2010),
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100304014526/http://www.bis.gov.uk/mansionhouse-speech.
168
Id.
169
Id.
170
Id.
171
Elizabeth Rigby & Brooke Masters, Kraft Given Food for Thought, FIN. TIMES (London), May
27, 2010, at 18.
172
TAKEOVER CODE, supra note 151, R. 2.6. The “put up or shut up rule” embodied in Rule 2.4(b)
requires a target corporation to name any acquirer with which is negotiating or that approaches it once
164
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The Panel promulgated these new rules in late 2011. The Panel claimed the
goal of the 2011 Amendments to the Takeover Code was to “increase the
protection for offeree companies . . . against protracted ‘virtual bid’ periods” by requiring bidders to identify themselves when making their bid announcement and to declare their firm intention to make an offer within
twenty-eight days of announcing their bid.173 The Panel also asserted that it
was “strengthen[ing] the position of the offeree company by . . . clarifying
that . . . boards are not limited in the factors that they may take into account
in giving their opinion on an offer.”174
In other words, the Panel touts the ability of the board to state its mind
as protective, ignoring the reality that boards have little authority to defend
themselves save sending shareholders urgently worded letters. Lord Mandelson’s suggestions appear to have gone nowhere; the threshold for a
change-of-control transaction remains stuck at fifty percent, rather than
two-thirds. This means that despite the shareholder protections offered by
the Takeover Code, the boards of British companies lack any real leverage
to negotiate with acquirers, hostile or otherwise. Without the leverage of defensive tactics, the board cannot induce a buyer to offer the appropriate
price for control of the company.175
In the more recent case of Eclairs Group Ltd, the UK Supreme Court
confirmed that in the UK board neutrality is so paramount as to prevent a
target board from attempting to thwart a corporate raider whose goal “was
to depress the values of the [target’s] shares so as to enable [the raider] to
buy other shares more cheaply” and seize control of the target’s subsidiary
without paying full price.176 More specifically, Eclairs Group and its affiliate Glengary sought to purchase shares in JKX, but the raiders—in an effort
to keep down the share price—did not disclose their arrangement to work
together when the Board demanded information on the raiders’ holdings
(lawfully under both statute and the articles of incorporation).177 Even

the negotiations or approach are made public. After the negotiation or approach is publicly identified,
the acquirer has 28 days to make a bid or it will have to wait six months before it can bid on the target
again. See Steven D. Solomon, British Takeover Rules May Mean Quicker Pace but Fewer Bids, N.Y.
TIMES DEALBOOK (Sept. 19, 2011 12:58 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/09/19/new-britishrules-will-speed-up-the-pace-of-takeovers/ (explaining many of The Takeover Code 2011 amendments
in general terms). As it turns out, the “put up or shut up rule” effectively prevents acquirers from disrupting a potential target’s day-to-day business operations by making public statements or leaking details about the deal under negotiation. See Aaron Kirchfeld & Matthew Campbell, Bankers Chafe Under
U.K. Takeover Rules, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 4, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/print/2013-0904/bankers-chafe-under-u-k-takeover-rules-that-embolden-targets.html.
173
THE TAKEOVER PANEL, Review of the 2011 Amendments to the Takeover Code, at 1 (Nov. 26,
2012), http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/2012-8.pdf.
174
Id.
175
See Strine, supra note 15, at 460.
176
Eclairs Group Ltd. v. JKX Oil & Gas Plc., [2015] UKSC 71, ¶ 25 (Can.).
177
Id.
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though JKX’s directors had reason to believe the responses the raiders provided were inaccurate, the target subsequent decision to strip Eclairs Group
from voting its shares was reversed by the UK Supreme Court because
JKX’s board acted partly to thwart a takeover by the raiders.178 In other
words, “the board neutrality policy effectively overrides the directors’ belief
that they are acting in the best interests of shareholders.”179 This level of
helplessness is unacceptable.
Eclairs held 27.55% and Glengary held 11.45% of JKX’s shares,
which aggregates to 39%. This exceeds the 30% mandatory bid threshold
(under Rule 5.1) requiring acquirers like the raiders to put in a tender offer
for all outstanding shares at a price equal to what the acquirers paid over the
last year.180 By failing to disclose their plan Eclairs Group and Glengary
purchased an unfairly inexpensive extra 9% stake in JKX that should have
been purchased as part of a mandatory bid, yet UK law leaves no room for
corporate boards to unilaterally thwart this kind of behavior with defensive
tactics like a low-threshold shareholder rights plan.
C. The United Kingdom Should Adopt the Canadian Rule
Adopting the Canadian Rule in the United Kingdom would be beneficial because it would give boards much needed time to assemble other offers and lobby shareholders while preventing acquirers and those acting in
concert from engaging in fait accompli tactics. The bargaining position of
the board would be reinforced. If the shareholders still like the takeover offer after waiting 105 days, the Takeover Panel can rescind the pill unless
the shareholders pre-approve its continuation in advance (or, if they want to
hew closer to current UK law, terminate the pill immediately). This gives
the target board more than the usual sixty days provided under Takeover
Code Rule 31.6 to secure an alternative transaction, persuade shareholders
that transaction is preferable, or persuade shareholders from tendering at all.
Had it been in place during the Cadbury takeover, Cadbury’s board might
have been in a better negotiating position such that it could have secured
terms binding Kraft to its commitments to keep jobs in the United Kingdom.
The Canadian rule would also help to encourage long-term investing
and “patient but engaged ownership”181 that can benefit stakeholders and
178

Id. ¶¶ 41–43.
Sam Bagot, Staying Neutral – UK Supreme Court Re-emphasizes Primacy of Board Neutrality
When Battles for Corporate Control Arise, CLEARY M&A & CORPORATE GOVERNANCE WATCH (March
22, 2016), http://www.clearymawatch.com/2016/03/staying-neutral-uk-supreme-court-re-emphasizesprimacy-of-board-neutrality-when-battles-for-corporate-control-arise/.
180
Eclairs Group Ltd., [2015] UKSC 71, ¶ 25.
181
Lord Mandelson, Speech at the Annual Trade and Industry Dinner, Mansion House (Mar. 1,
2010),
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100304014526/http://www.bis.gov.uk/mansion179
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shareholders alike. Lord Mandelson argued that the duties imposed on directors by § 172 of the Companies Act of 2006 require “directors to consider the best outcome for a company in the long term, considering the interests of all the stakeholders – employees, suppliers, and its brands and
capabilities.”182 Lord Mandelson even acknowledged that “[g]etting a higher price in a takeover may not be a perfect proxy for [those interests].”183
Still, without adopting the Canadian Rule allowing the board to adopt the
most effective takeover defenses, § 172 offers hollow hope of increased negotiating power because the Takeover Code operates as a separate duty.184
Rule 21 flatly forbids the board from taking any defensive action without
shareholder approval.185 Authoritative practitioners attempting to reconcile
Rule 21 with § 172 do not even consider the possibility of defensive tactics
without shareholder authorization.186 If the panel were to adopt the Canadian Rule, then Rule 21’s prohibition would be partially repealed, thereby allowing directors the freedom under the Companies Act to seek the best outcome for the company long-term (which is incidentally in their best
interest).
The Canadian Rule is not without its detractors. Jennifer Payne of Oxford University argues that similar rules allowing only “original” shareholders (shareholders who are neither the bidder nor its affiliates) the right
to vote on change of control transaction are “undesirable.”187 Professor
Payne suggests these rules must not be implemented in the United Kingdom
because they “appear contrary to the principle of equality stated in the
Takeover Directive and in General Principle 1 of the Takeover Code.”188
General Principle 1 states that “[a]ll holders of the securities of an offeree
company of the same class must be afforded equivalent treatment; moreover, if a person acquires control of a company, the other holders of securities must be protected.”189
Equality among offeree-shareholders is primary concern of takeover
regimes in the United States190 and Canada191 as well. The Canadian Rule
house-speech.
182
Id.
183
Id.
184
See VON BISMARCK, supra note 144, ¶¶ 763–64 (2013).
185
TAKEOVER CODE, supra note 151, R. 21.1.
186
See Jonathan Mukwiri, Directors’ Duties in Takeover Bids and English Company Law, 19 INT’L
CO. & COM. L. REV. 281, 285–86.
187
PAYNE, supra note 6, at 124.
188
Id. at 124 n.189.
189
TAKEOVER CODE, supra note 151, Gen. Princ. 1.
190
See Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, 564 A.2d 1137, 1146 (Del. 1989) (rejecting attempt to pay
minority stockholders less for their stocks); Delaware General Corporate Law (“DGCL”), DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 262(a) (West 2014) (procedure for ensuring dissenting shareholders paid adequately); 17
C.F.R. § 230.801(a)(3) (2015) (SEC equal treatment rule).
191
One fundamental way the securities laws protect shareholders is “by requiring that all securi-
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does not offend underlying policy rationale for General Principle 1 because
allowing only original shareholders to vote on whether to rescind the shareholder rights plan helps ensure that all shareholders get a better price if the
company is sold. The Canadian Rule enhances the consideration paid to all
shareholders for the control stake. Hence, the Canadian Rule actually furthers the General Principles under the Code. Finally, reforming the United
Kingdom’s takeover system would be very easy logistically.192 The Canadian proposed rules could be adopted unilaterally by The Takeover Panel, taking advantage of existing institutional frameworks and knowledge while
still allowing British shareholders to benefit from maximized value at the
time of sale. At the same time, using the Canadian rule will not overtax the
panel because, as was explained in the American context, the rule governs
voting procedures which are easily administered.
In mid-July 2016, UK Prime Minister Theresa May indicated in her
first major policy speech plans to scrutinize foreign takeover bids to ensure
they are in the national interest.193 Prime Minister May expressed unambiguous opposition to foreign acquisitions of strategically important British
businesses and cited the takeover of Cadbury and near-takeover of AstraZeneca as transactions her government would have blocked.194 However,
when faced with the sale of British computer chip designer ARM to a Japanese firm, both the PM and Chancellor Philip Hammond expressed their
full support.195 Only time will tell whether May’s early pronouncements
were mere posturing or whether a more formal public interest review procedure will be put in place. However, given the difficulties Canada experienced with securities commissions exercising free-wheeling public interest
discretion (albeit to facilitate rather than forestall takeover bids), it might be
best to leave the target’s board and their shareholders in control.196 In other
tyholders are treated equally in price and pro rata participation.” Re Pulse Data Inc., 2007 ABASC 895,
¶ 93 (citing David Johnston & Kathleen Doyle Rockwell, Canadian Securities Regulation 268–87
(2006)) (Can.). See also Re Stornoway Diamond Corp., 2006 BCSECCOM 533, ¶ 36 (citing Re CDC
Life Sciences Inc., [1988] 11 OSCB 2541, 2542 (noting that Canadian law seeks to ensure shareholders
are treated equally by purchasers)).
192
Compare this situation with that of the United States where board-protective statutes allowing for
poison bills without shareholder votes must be repealed by state legislatures. As noted above, it appears
judges cannot make the necessary changes to American system of takeover regulations without completely remaking the doctrine regarding the duty of care as it exists within DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 141(a) (West 2014).
193
George Parker, Theresa May’s In-Tray — Brexit, the Economy and Social Reform, FIN. TIMES (July
13, 2016), https://next.ft.com/content/ce627152-48fd-11e6-8d68-72e9211e86ab.
194
Robert Peston, ARM Takeover is Theresa May's First Huge Test, ITV NEWS (July 18, 2016, 8:03
AM), http://www.itv.com/news/2016-07-18/arm-takeover-is-theresa-mays-first-huge-test/.
195
Id.
196
If the Prime Minister did decide to implement this policy, it would seem inappropriate to lodge the
public interest review authority with the Takeover Panel as it is presently constituted, if only because the
Panel’s remit has always been to protect shareholders rather than stakeholders (i.e. employees), let alone
the national interest. See Kenju Watanabe, Control Transaction Governance: Collective Action and
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words, if shareholders want to sell, let them, but give the boards of directors
enough time to mount a viable defense if they believe it is in the best interests of the company and the shareholders in the long-run. Allowing for
shareholder rights plans and a Canadian-style extended deposit period accomplishes this goal.
D. Schemes of Arrangement Unaffected by Canadian Rule
The Canadian Rule is also advantageous because it cures the pathological weakness of corporate boards in the normal British takeover regime
without causing additional problems for other methods of accomplishing
takeovers. In addition to the traditional tender offer to shareholders most associated with the Takeover Panel, UK law provides another way for acquirers to gain control of a company: the scheme of arrangement.197 A scheme
is defined as a “compromise” or “arrangement” between a company and its
creditors or shareholders (“members” in the language of the Act).198 At the
very least, any arrangement must involve some minimal element of reciprocal concessions.199
While initially used for reorganization of insolvent companies,
schemes of arrangement are an increasingly common takeover method for
widely held companies in the United Kingdom.200 To oversimplify, a
scheme operates like a Chapter 11 bankruptcy. A creditor, shareholder, or
the company proposes a scheme of reorganization in court, and then the
creditors and shareholders vote in classes to approve the scheme.201 If 75%
of a class votes to approve the scheme, the court compels the 25% minority
to accept it.202 Then a court blesses the plan as fair and equitable, and all
parties are bound by the agreement.203
An advantage of a scheme of arrangement is that an acquirer needs to
secure the votes of only 75% of each class to compel minority shareholders
to sell their stakes, whereas squeeze-out mergers are available only when an
acquirer has obtained 90% of the outstanding shares.204 While this makes it
easier to gain 100% control of the target corporation when the takeover is
friendly, a hostile takeover via a scheme is much more difficult because the
Asymmetric Information Problems and Ex post Policing, 36 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 45, 139–42 (arguing
that gatekeeping functions in corporate change-of-control transactions must be entrusted to institutions
having both the skill and predisposition to enforce them).
197
The Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 895 (U.K.).
198
Id. § 895(1).
199
PAYNE, supra note 6, at 21.
200
Id. at 86. Schemes of Arrangement are mentioned in this paper only because of their increasing
frequency. It is highly unlikely that a hostile takeover could be accomplished using a scheme.
201
The Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 896(2) (U.K.).
202
PAYNE, supra note 6, at 4.
203
Id. at 3.
204
Id. at 95–96.
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acquirer needs to obtain the votes of 75% of the voting shares. This is made
even harder because the court will not count acquirer’s shares or those
owned by entities affiliated with acquirer.205 Like the Canadian rule, only
the “original” shareholders votes count, but the scheme requirements demand not 50% approval but 75%. This means adopting the Canadian rule
will not increase the number of takeover schemes compared to offers since
the ability to rescind the poison pill makes it no easier to accomplish a
scheme. Detractors of the Canadian rule cannot find support in any pretended effects on the scheme of arrangement mechanism.
VI. CONCLUSION
Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom all have problems
with their respective systems of regulating takeovers. In Canada, an overzealous application of public interest jurisdiction by regulators created uncertainty and arguably began to impugn the will of shareholders by rescinding SRPs and forcing votes on bids shareholders did not want to vote on.
The Canadian solution resolved the problem by leaving the ultimate question of whether the pill must go to shareholders. Both the American and
British takeover schemes could benefit from the Canadian example.
In the United States, state statutes and judicial precedent have made
the American corporate board essentially an impenetrable fortress leaving
shareholders and acquirers with nearly insurmountable barriers to rescinding a poison pill. Adopting the Canadian rule would maintain the board’s
negotiating flexibility while making them accountable to the true owners of
the company.
The United Kingdom has the exact opposite problem. British boards
suffer from a lack of negotiating power and are unable to maximize shareholder value to the same degree as their Canadian and American counterparts. Adopting the Canadian rule preserves share-holder primacy while
giving directors needed leverage in a bidders market.
In sum, three countries, three different problems, and Canada provides
one elegant solution.
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